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THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE AND FIDUCIARY DUTY
CLAIMS: NOTHING STRICTER THAN THE MORALS
OF THE MARKETPLACE?
AMANDA K. ESQUIBEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
C OMPENSATION for economic loss is a subject that has long
intrigued both practitioners and academics. This vast subject
includes a rule known as the economic loss rule ("ELR"). In its
broadest formulation, the ELR bars the recovery of economic loss
in most tort actions unless the victim has also suffered some sort of
personal injury or property damage.' The rationale for this rule is
that a person spared such harm is, or should be, adequately pro-
tected from economic loss through contractual remedies.2
This Article discusses the application of the ELR to bar claims
for breaches of fiduciary duties and the propriety of doing so.3 Part
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, The Univer-
sity of Memphis. The author appreciates the financial support of the University of
Memphis and the work of Tony Childress and Phoebe McGlynn in assisting with
this Article. The author also thanks Harry R. Schafer, Esq., shareholder with the
law firm of Kenny, Nachwalter, Seymour, Arnold, Critchlow & Spector, Miami,
Florida, for his helpful comments.
1. SeeJAY M. FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE: LIABILITY OF PROFESSIONALS AND
BusINESSES TO THIRD PARTIES FOR ECONOMic Loss 119 (1995) (discussing eco-
nomic loss rule ("ELR") in detail). The ELR, in some form or another, has been
adopted in most jurisdictions. For a compendium of cases, see generally FEINMAN,
supra, at 119, and William K. Jones, Product Defects Causing Commercial Loss: The
Ascendancy of Contract over Tort, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 731 (1990).
2. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d
899, 902 (Fla. 1987) (noting that contractual remedies such as insurance and war-
ranties can adequately protect purchaser).
3. See Alpert v. Shafer, No. 89 CIV. 0839 (CSH), 1991 WL 222130, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1991) ("Broadly stated, a fiduciary relationship is one founded
upon trust or confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of
another.... The rule embraces both technical fiduciary relations and those infor-
mal relations which exist whenever one man trusts in, and relies upon, another.");
see also Atlantic Nat'l Bank of Fla. v. Vest, 480 So. 2d 1328, 1332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985) ("[A fiduciary relationship] exists . . . where influence has been acquired
and abused, and in which confidence has been reposed and betrayed. The origin
of the confidence is immaterial. The rule embraces both technical fiduciary rela-
tions and informal relations that exist whenever one man trusts and relies upon
another."); In re Estate of Heilman, 345 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) ("A
fiduciary relation arises whenever confidence is reposed on one side, and domina-
tion and influence result on the other; the relation can be legal, social, domestic
or merely personal."); Williams v. Griffin, 192 N.W.2d 283, 285 (Mich. Ct. App.
1971) ("Such a relationship exists when there is a reposing of faith, confidence,
(789)
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II provides a general overview of the ELR.4 Part III discusses the
history and evolution of the ELR in several states that have had ex-
perience with the rule's application to breach of fiduciary duty
claims.5 Part IV illustrates doctrinal weaknesses of the ELR in the
fiduciary context. 6 In light of these weaknesses, Part V recom-
mends an improved analytical structure for considering issues of
economic loss in settings involving allegations of both breach of
contract and breach of fiduciary duty.7 Such a structure is critical
for courts who consider applying the ELR to breach of fiduciary
duty claims. Finally, Part VI concludes that the unpleasant exper-
iences of some courts should dissuade other courts from blindly
applying the ELR to bar breach of fiduciary duty claims. 8
and trust, and the placing of reliance by one upon the judgment and advice of
another.").
4. For a discussion of the ELR generally, see infra notes 9-25 and accompany-
ing text.
5. For a discussion of the history and evolution of the ELR doctrine and its
application to breach of fiduciary duty cases, specifically for Florida, Illinois, New
Jersey and New York, see infra notes 26-249 and accompanying text.
In addition to punitive damages, courts confronted with breach of fiduciary
duty claims have fashioned many different types of relief in order to provide vic-
tims with full compensation and deter fiduciaries from wrongdoing. See, e.g., Pol-
lack v. Lytle, 175 Cal. Rptr. 81, 86 (Ct. App. 1981) (stating that fiduciary must place
injured party in same position he would have enjoyed had fiduciary faithfully per-
formed his duties); Steelman v. Mallory, 716 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Idaho 1986) (ruling
that measure of damages in breach of fiduciary duty claim by corporate director is
profit that director received); Henderson v. Hassur, 594 P.2d 650, 653 (Kan. 1979)
(noting that disloyal agent required to account to his principal for secret profit
and also had to forfeit compensation that he had received from principal); Bess-
man v. Bessman, 520 P.2d 1210, 1211 (Kan. 1974) (requiring faithless servant to
forfeit compensation otherwise due for services rendered during period of his
faithfulness); Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (ruling
that damages for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with buyout of minority
shareholder of closely held corporation was difference between fair market value
of minority shareholder's shares and amount he would have received under
buyout agreement); Line v. Rouse, 491 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Neb. 1992) (measuring
damages as monetary damage to estate caused by personal representative's breach
of fiduciary duty); Stoeckel v. Block, 566 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (App. Div. 1991) (stat-
ing that former employees who breached fiduciary duty by soliciting employer's
customers are subject to damages in amount employer would have made but for
employees' wrong, including lost opportunities for profits on accounts diverted
through employees' conduct).
6. For a discussion of the weaknesses of the ELR in the fiduciary context, see
infra notes 250-87 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of an alternative doctrine in breach of fiduciary duty cases,
see infra notes 288-303 and accompanying text.
8. For the conclusion of this Article, see infra notes 304-07 and accompanying
text.
790 [Vol. 42: p. 789
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ELR
Far removed from the fiduciary context, the ELR originated in
the products liability context, an area in which the prevention and
redress of personal injury and property damage are of prime con-
cern.9 Illustration of the operation of the ELR in the products lia-
bility arena is easy. Assume, for example, that an aspiring grass
cutter acquires a lawnmower. Because of negligent design, the
lawnmower malfunctions upon its first use and self-destructs. The
lawnmower injures no one, nor any property other than itself. Un-
fortunately, however, the lawnmower's destruction is untimely in
that the aspiring grass cutter had several lucrative contracts to mow
his or her neighbors' lawns that he or she must now cancel. Efforts
to locate a replacement lawnmower prove futile. 10
Disappointed, the aspiring grass cutter would like to recover
the profits from these contracts. A lawyer tells the aspiring grass
cutter that he or she may not recover these profits in a contract
action because there is nothing to suggest that at the time of sale,
the lawnmower's seller had reason to know of the aspiring grass
cutter's lucrative contracts."1 Likewise, it does not appear that the
Uniform Commercial Code will permit recovery of such profits in
any warranty claims. 12 The lawyer also tells the grass cutter that the
9. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866-68
(1986) (noting public policy origin of products liability); Note, Economic Loss in
Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 919-42 (1966) (noting origin
and history of ELR). See generally Christopher W. Weber, Note, Purchaser of a Defec-
tive Product Cannot Recover Purely Economic Loss Against a Component Part Supplier of the
Finished Product Under Tort or Breach of Implied Warranty Theories: Hininger v. Case
Corp., 23 F.3d 124 (5th Cir. 1994), 26 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1287, 1289-95 (1995)
(supporting origin of ELR in products liability context). For a discussion of
Alaska's ELR in the products liability context, see Thomas A. Matthews, Products
Liability in Alaska, A Practitioner's Overview, 10 AiAsKA L. REv. 1 (1993).
10. For an interesting discussion advocating for the viability of claims for neg-
ligent interference with economic expectations, see generally Roger B. Godwin,
Negligent Interference with Economic Expectancy: The Case for Recovery, 16 ST'AN. L. REv.
664 (1964).
11. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 146 (1854) (considering
whether mill owner should be able to recover on contract theory against dilatory
repair shop for economic loss caused by missed business opportunities). The
Court, in its famous decision, rejected this contention on the basis that the loss was
not foreseeable to the repair shop, as it was not contemplated by the parties at the
time of bargaining for the repair. See id. at 150; see also Kevin R. Sido, Damages
Recoverable on Tort Theories in Construction Cases, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 78, 79 (1995)
("Generally, a party to a contract may recover [foreseeable] damages that are the
proximate result of the breach .... On the other hand, in tort cases, the defend-
ant is usually argued as being liable for . . . damages [that] are anticipated or
contemplated.").
12. U.C.C. § 2-715 (1994) (limiting buyer's recovery of consequential dam-
ages to losses, which generally in absence of personal injury or property damage
1997]
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ELR bars any negligence or other tort claims for the recovery of
these profits because there is no accompanying personal injury or
property damage, other than to the product itself.13
This example demonstrates how the ELR may lead to some
harsh results for a prospective plaintiff. The ELR essentially rele-
gates an individual who suffers purely economic loss caused by an-
other's tortious conduct to contract or warranty remedies, which, as
illustrated above, may not exist or may not provide the victim with
complete compensation. 14 Not only may the ELR have the effect of
foreclosing recovery for such economic losses, but it may also de-
prive a litigant of the opportunity to seek punitive damages by bar-
ring the victim's tort claim. 15
Additionally, the plaintiff, without a tort claim, loses several
other advantages. For example, courts may disregard disclaimers
and exculpatory clauses in a tort action; tort claims may not require
"result[s] from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at
the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be
prevented by cover or otherwise" and essentially codifying Hadley).
13. For an informative discussion in an analogous situation, see generally
Rachael Scott Decker, Court Limits Tort Remedies in Contract, 46 S.C. L. REv. 31
(1994). This commentator discusses a case that barred a negligence claim arising
from component part's failure, resulting in substantial damage to property not
owned by the plaintiff. See id. at 35 (discussing Myrtle Beach Pipeline Corp. v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 843 F. Supp. 1027 (D.S.C. 1993)).
14. See id. at 31.
15. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hanft, 436 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1983)
(holding that punitive damages normally not recoverable in breach of contract
action); Pelletier v. Schultz, 276 S.E.2d 118, 120 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (ruling that
punitive damages may not be demanded in contract claim); Jim Walter Homes,
Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1986) (noting that intentional breach of
contract or gross negligence in breach of contract will not entitle injured party to
"exemplary" damages); White v. Benkowski, 155 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Wis. 1967) (hold-
ing that punitive damages not recoverable in breach of contract action). But see
FrankJ. Cavico, Jr., Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract-A Principled Approach, 22
ST. MARY's L.J. 357, 372-81 (1990) (discussing various "exception and subterfuges"
that courts have employed to allow award of punitive damages in contract cases);
Sandra Chutorian, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: the Expansion of Tortious Breach
of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing into the Commercial Realm, 86
COLUM. L. Rv. 377, 378-91 (1986) (discussing how some courts, dissatisfied with
traditional contract remedies, have applied tort principles, including punitive
damages, to various areas of contract law).
Punitive damages are awarded frequently by courts for breaches of fiduciary
duty. See, e.g., Wagman v. Lee, 457 A.2d 401, 404 (D.C. 1983) (noting punitive
damages are reasonable if there exists independent fiduciary relationship); Capital
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hohman, 682 P.2d 1309, 1310 (Kan. 1984) (awarding
mortgagers punitive damages for breach of fiduciary duty by bank); Manges v.
Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. 1984) (awarding recovery of actual and exem-
plary damages against breaching fiduciary); Mulder v. Mittelstadt, 352 N.W.2d 223,
229 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (awarding shareholders punitive damages for directors'
breach of fiduciary duty).
[Vol. 42: p. 789
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timely notice and may be subject to a longer statute of limitations.
Moreover, tort claims may have fewer obstacles than contract claims
that present issues such as parol evidence, statute of frauds, inter-
pretation of terms, uncertainty, illegality or lack of consideration. 16
While the ELR has many critics, 17 there are important public
policy justifications for its existence. 18 The principal justification is
a deeply rooted jurisprudential belief that contract remedies are
superior to tort remedies for dealing with issues of economic loss. 19
For instance, in a contractual setting, the parties have the opportu-
nity to allocate risks and, in many instances, should be encouraged
to do so. 20 The theory is that parties, having contracted for certain
16. See William Way, Note, The Problem of Economic Damages: Reconceptualizing
the Moorman Doctrine, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 1169, 1173-74 (1991) (comparing tort
law with contract law).
17. See, e.g., Edward T. O'Donnell et al., On the Differences Between Blood and Red
Ink: A Second Look at the Policy Arguments for the Abrogation of the Economic Loss Rule in
Consumer Litigation, 19 NOVA L. Ruv. 923, 926 (1995) (discussing arguments for
and against abolishment of ELR); Paul J. Schwiep, The Economic Loss Rule Outbreak:
The Monster That Ate Commercial Torts, 69 FLA. B.J. 34, 41-42 (1995) (criticizing ap-
plicability of ELR to "all tort claims for economic losses without accompanying
personal injury or property damage").
18. See, e.g., Michael J. Bond, Rebuilding the Citadel of Privity, 30 GONZ. L. REv.
221, 231-34 (1995) (noting that public policy supports ELR); Luther P. House, Jr.
& HubertJ. Bell, Jr., The Economic Loss Rule: Fair Balancing of Interests, 11 CONSTRUC-
TION LAw 1, 29-30 (1991) (advocating fairness of ELR in construction contracts
because it "fairly allocates business risks among contracting and known parties"
and allows contracting parties to "adjust their respective obligations in their agree-
ments to conform to their expectations and their willingness to bargain"); Frank
Nussbaum, The Economic Loss Rule and Intentional Torts: A Shield or a Sword?, 8 ST.
THOMAS L. REv. 473, 476 (1996) ("The economic loss rule may have merit in light
of current trends . . . to allocate the risk between innocent and negligent par-
ties .... [I]t is an inappropriate rule to vitiate common law torts created as a
matter of public policy to protect society from intentional wrongdoers."); Ann
O'Brien, Limited Recovery Rule as a Dam: Preventing a Flood of Litigation for Negligent
Infliction of Pure Economic Loss, 31 ARiz. L. REv. 959, 966 (1989) ("One of the most
significant concerns with permitting the plaintiff to sue for negligent infliction of
economic loss is that the defendant will be subjected to unlimited liability. The
judiciary confronts.., the administrative problem of overloading the courts, and
... the problem of imposing disproportionate liability on the defendant.") (foot-
notes omitted); Kelly M. Hnatt, Note, Purely Economic Loss: A Standard for Recovery,
73 IowA L. REv. 1181, 1182-83 (1988) ("Courts that deny recovery of purely eco-
nomic losses often base their decisions on the perception that the policies behind
tort law argue for manageable limits on liability, maintaining that a physical harm
requirement serves as a convenient touchstone for limiting recovery.").
19. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So.
2d 899, 902 (Fla. 1987) (stating that lack of tort remedy does not preclude contract
remedy).
20. See id. (noting that contractual bargaining or insurance can afford
protection).
1997]
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rights or remedies, generally ought to be held to their bargain, irre-
spective of the ex post burdens.21
Another popular policy rationale for the ELR is that its applica-
tion prevents subjecting one to liability disproportionate to the neg-
ligent action. 22 For instance, if one negligently operates an
automobile by plowing into an electrical pole and causing a power
outage in a busy business district, there are numerous individuals
who will suffer business interruption because of the driver's negli-
gence. The ELR will generally bar tort actions by these individuals,
sparing the justice system the agony of sorting out such a mess,
while saving the driver of the vehicle from potential bankruptcy for
a relatively slight infraction. 23
Over the years, perhaps as a result of such policy justifications,
the ELR has spread outside the products liability context and into
other commercial sectors of tort law.2 4 In these areas, personal in-
jury or property damage is often of little or no concern. Indeed,
many torts such as fraud, tortious interference, defamation, conver-
sion and this Article's concern, claims for breach of fiduciary duty,
are designed to redress primarily economic loss. 25
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ELR AND ITS EXPANSION INTO THE
FIDUCIARY CONTEXT
A. The Supreme Court's View
The United States Supreme Court confronted the ELR in East
River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.26 In East River, a
shipbuilder contracted for the design, manufacture and installation
of several ship turbines that subsequently malfunctioned. 27 While
21. This rationale breaks down when there is uneven bargaining power be-
tween the parties. Courts, however, have been reluctant to consider this fact. This
may be because of the burden that would be created in case after case by causing
courts to inquire into this aspect of the parties' relationship. Consideration of this
aspect is, however, important to achieving rational results in the fiduciary intent.
22. For a discussion of the ELR generally, see supra notes 9-25 and accompa-
nying text.
23. See House & Bell, supra note 18, at 29-30 (supporting policy concerns be-
hind application of ELR).
24. For a discussion of cases in which courts applied the ELR to the fiduciary
context, see infra notes 26-249 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the varying contexts in which courts apply ELR, see
infra notes 26-249 and accompanying text.
26. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
27. Id. at 858. Although the turbines injured only themselves, the charterers
of these vessels sued for the cost of repairs and for income lost while the ships were
being repaired. See id. at 861. The initial complaint contained breach of warranty
and contract claims, as well as tort claims. See id. The defendant, however, inter-
[Vol. 42: p. 789
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the plaintiffs filed several claims, the Supreme Court only ad-
dressed the tort claims. 28
The Supreme Court noted that products liability law "grew out
of a public policy judgment that people need more protection from
dangerous products than is afforded by the law of warranty.' 2 9 The
initial concern with hazards to life and health then expanded to
property.30 In a traditional "property damage" case, the product
damages other property. In East River, however, the product dam-
aged only itself.31
The Supreme Court then identified the spectrum of thought
with respect to the availability of a tort action when a product in-
jures only itself.3 2 At one end of the spectrum, the majority view,
forwarded in Seely v. White Motor Co., 33 held that no tort action was
available. 34 At the other end, the minority view, expressed in Santor
v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,3 5 held that such an action was available
despite the lack of personal injury or property damage.3 6 The
Supreme Court also made note of a middle ground where courts
struggled with the distinction between plaintiffs merely disap-
pointed with the performance of a product and plaintiffs endan-
gered, but fortuitously spared, personal injury or property
damage.3 7
posed a successful statute of limitations defense to some claims, leaving only the
tort ones. See id.
28. See id. The defendant then moved for summary judgment, arguing that
the charterers could not recover under tort theories because they only suffered
economic loss. See id. at 861-62. This formed the basis for the appeal to the
United States Supreme Court. See id. at 863.
29. Id. at 866 (noting public policy origin of products liability law).
30. See id. at 867.
31. Id. In this case, because the turbine was an integrated package and only
its component parts were destroyed, there was no personal injury or other prop-
erty damage. See id. The lack of such harm is the hallmark of a warranty action.
See id. at 868. A contracting party can protect itself against purely economic loss by
negotiating such warranty protection. See id.
32. See id. at 868-69 (noting spectrum of cases addressing issue of whether tort
action can be brought if product injures itself).
33. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
34. See East River, 476 U.S. at 868.
35. 207 A.2d 305, 312-13 (N.J. 1965).
36. See East River, 476 U.S. at 868-69. The Supreme Court had similar con-
cerns about the minority view, believing it would greatly expand liability and im-
permissibly intrude on the traditional realm of contract. See id.
37. See id. at 869-71 (expressing thoughts on all three views and its impact on
liability). With regard to the intermediate position, the Court stated that, irrespec-
tive of the nature of the product's damage, gradual or calamitous, the loss re-
mained purely economic, and hence, one that the Court should address' through
contract theory. See id. at 870-71.
19971
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court rejected these latter ap-
proaches and instead embraced Seely, stating that it "most naturally
understood [the plaintiffs claim] as a warranty claim."38 Thus, the
Supreme Court left the parties to their contractual bargains and
warranty protection. 39 The Court concluded that "whether stated
in negligence or strict liability, no products-liability claim lies ...
when the only injury claimed is economic loss."40 Therefore, the
Supreme Court recognized and applied the ELR in the products
liability context, and in so doing, it analyzed the competing public
policy concerns of contract and tort.4 1
In a sense, the Supreme Court saw the tort action as the re-
serve weapon, only available if the harm suffered extended beyond
that available under a contract theory and if the character of that
harm triggered public safety concerns. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, was not asked to, nor did it explore the interplay of these pol-
icy concerns outside the context of products liability actions. It
expressed no opinion as to whether its view of the relationship be-
tween contract and tort would be context specific. Needless to say,
it said nothing about breach of fiduciary duty claims.
It was, perhaps, a general failure to confront the significance of
the context that permitted the ELR's rapid expansion into other
areas of the law. As a result, courts have had tremendous difficulty
determining the ELR's appropriate application outside the prod-
ucts liability context. In particular, Florida courts have had the
most experience down this arduous and unpredictable path.
B. The ELR in Florida
1. General Application of the ELR
In 1987, the Florida Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases
concerning the ELR-F/orida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec-
38. Id. at 872. The Court did not believe that the increased costs to society
associated with extending tort remedies were justified, especially when such losses
could be, presumably, more efficiently insured against. See id. at 871-72. Warranty
claims have inherent limits on liability arising out of privity and the Hadley require-
ment of foreseeability. See id. at 874. There are no such limits in a tort action. See
id. at 874-75.
39. See id. This was despite the Court's acknowledgement of the unavailability
of such claims in this case. See id.
40. Id. at 876.
41. See id. The former, in its view, was a method of private ordering by which
risk of loss is contemplated, allocated and ultimately respected by the parties or an
enforcing court. See id. The availability of tort actions, however, served a different
purpose, namely, to protect and redress the individuals in a society who were in-
jured (in their person or property) by a manufacturer's carelessness. See id.
[Vol. 42: p. 789
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tric Co., 4 2 Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Therm-O-Disc., Inc.43 and AFM
Corp. v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co..44 The Florida Power,
42. 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987). In this case, Westinghouse agreed to design,
manufacture and furnish two nuclear steam supply systems, including six steam
generators. See id. at 900. Florida Power & Light Company ("FPL") allegedly dis-
covered leaks in all six generators. See id. It then sued Westinghouse for breach of
express warranties in the contract and for negligence. See id. The trial court de-
nied Westinghouse's motion for partial summary judgment on the breach of war-
ranty count, but granted its motion for summary judgment on the negligence
count on the ground that Florida law precludes the recovery of economic loss
without any claim of personal injury or property damage to other property. See id.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the
following question was certified to the Supreme Court of Florida: "Whether Flor-
ida law permits a buyer under a contract for goods to recover economic losses in
tort without a claim for personal injury or property damage to property other than
the allegedly defective goods." Id. at 899. In answering the certified question in
the negative, the Florida Supreme Court reasoned that the contract between the
parties allocated the risks negotiated and that, generally, principles of contract are
more appropriate than tort principles to resolve purely economic claims. See id. at
900. The Florida Power court explained:
We . . . find no reason to intrude into the parties' allocation of risk by
imposing a tort duty and corresponding cost burden on the public. We
hold contract principles more appropriate than tort principles for resolv-
ing economic loss without an accompanying physical injury or property
damage. The economic loss rule has a long, historic basis originating
with the privity doctrine, which precluded recovery of economic losses
outside a contractual setting. Consequently, we hold that the economic
loss rule should be applied to the instant case.
Id. at 902.
43. 511 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 1987). The Florida Supreme Court's second 1987
decision concerning the ELR, Aetna Life, arose in a slightly different context than
FloRida Power, that of a challenge to personal jurisdiction under the long arm stat-
ute. See id. at 993-94. The question presented was whether a certain subsection of
a Florida statute "permitt[ed] jurisdiction to be obtained over nonresidents for
acts arising outside the state which cause financial injury within the state when no
personal injury or physical property damage has occurred." Id. at 993; see FLA.
STAT. § 48.193(1) (f) (1995) (defining acts subjecting person to jurisdiction of
courts of Florida).
The Aetna Life court held that the provisions of the relevant section contem-
plated only personal injury or physical property damage and, therefore, did not
confer jurisdiction when the injury was purely financial in nature. See Aetna Life,
511 So. 2d at 994. In reaching this result, the Florida Supreme Court cited its
earlier decision in Florida Power. See id. Accordingly, the "property damage" re-
ferred to in Florida Power must be viewed as "physical property damage," not merely
economic loss. See id.
The Aetna Life court believed that this statute was intended to permit jurisdic-
tion in products liability actions. See id. In light of the statute's wording and the
compelling policy to protect the state's citizenry from harm, however, it was not
entirely clear why the Florida Supreme Court felt constrained to limit the statute's
reach to personal injury and physical property damage. See id. The different poli-
cies at play in applying a jurisdictional statute and permitting a cause of action in
tort were not addressed.
44. 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987). The Florida Supreme Court in AFM moved
even farther away from the products liability context in this case. AFM Corpora-
tion had contracted with Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company for ad-
vertising in the yellow pages. See id. at 180-81. "When AFM moved, the parties
9
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Aetna Life and AFM trilogy spawned numerous decisions from Flor-
ida's district courts of appeal, as well as several decisions from fed-
eral courts in the Eleventh Circuit, which essentially held that
absent accompanying personal injury or physical property damage,
the ELR bars tort claims where parties are in a contractual setting.45
agreed to a referral service to assist AFM's prospective customers." Id. at 180. The
distributed yellow pages listed AFM's old telephone number, which, because of the
move, was not the correct current number. See id. "The problem was com-
pounded when Southern Bell mistakenly assigned AFM's old number to another
customer, resulting in the automatic referral system disconnection." Id.
"In asserting a claim for economic loss, AFM chose to proceed solely on a tort
theory .. .and specifically announced it was not basing its tort theory on any
agreement between the parties." Id. at 181. Nonetheless, the court found that
AFM had not proved a tort distinguishable from or independent of the breach of
contract itself, and held that, "without some conduct resulting in personal injury
or property damage, there can be no independent tort flowing from a contractual
breach which would justify a tort claim solely for economic losses." Id. at 181-82.
Hence, under the ELR as adopted in AFM, when a plaintiff suffers purely eco-
nomic loss as a result of a defendant's negligent or intentional failure to perform
its obligations under a contract to provide services to the plaintiff, the court pre-
cludes the plaintiff from seeking recovery against the defendant under tort theo-
ries. See id. at 180-82.
In AFM, the plaintiff's strategic pleading forced the court to address the effect
of a contract on the purported tort claims. See id. at 181. Hence, the court added
the concept of an independent tort. See id. The court suggested, however, that
such an independent tort could not exist in the absence of personal injury or prop-
erty damage. See id. at 181-82. It failed to consider the fact that some torts, like
claims for breach of fiduciary duty, generally redress purely economic harm.
Therefore, certain facts might justify the pleading of both a contract and a tort
claim, even in the absence of personal injury or property damage. The Florida
Supreme Court, however, did not contemplate this scenario. See id.
45. See Serina v. Albertson's, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D. Fla. 1990). In
Serina, an employee sued his employer for fraud. See id. at 1115. The employee
charged the defendant with depriving him of bonus monies by basing the bonus
calculations on operating statements that showed smaller profits than the actual
statements provided to corporate officials. See id. The defendant moved for sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff could not establish conduct or
damages separate and distinct from his rights pursuant to the contract. See id. In
granting the defendant's summary judgment motion, the Serina court noted that
the facts surrounding the plaintiff's tort claim would be interwoven with the facts
surrounding a breach of contract claim, had the plaintiff chosen to bring such a
cause of action. See id. at 1118. Thus, the Serina court applied the ELR to bar a
tort claim between parties in privity, even though a breach of contract claim had
not been specifically pled or asserted by the party seeking recovery.
Serina was followed by Government Personnel Services, Inc. v. Government Personnel
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 759 F. Supp. 792 (M.D. Fla. 1991), aff'd, 986 F.2d 507
(11th Cir. 1993). In that case, former employees brought an action against their
former employer, asserting that the employer defrauded them by tampering with
computer reports on which their compensation was based. See id. at 793. In enter-
ing summary judgment for the defendant, the court ruled that the ELR barred the
fraud claim because the plaintiffs' tort claim was not independent of the plaintiffs
breach of contract claim. See id. at 793-94.
In J Allen, Inc. v. Humana of Florida, Inc., 571 So. 2d 565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently misrepresented amounts
due when the parties entered into a contract. See id. at 566. The trial court denied
[Vol. 42: p. 789
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Thereafter, the Florida Supreme Court expanded the ELR's appli-
cation to encompass situations where no contract existed between
the litigating parties.
In Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons,
Inc.,46 a concrete manufacturer defectively made a batch of con-
crete used in the repair of several homes.47 The concrete con-
tained high levels of salt that caused the reinforcing bars to rust;
consequently, some of the concrete cracked and broke, damaging
some of the homes. 48 Instead of suing the previous homeowners
for breach of warranty, the homeowners sought to sue the concrete
manufacturer in tort.49
The parties framed the arguments before the Florida Supreme
Court in terms of the ELR.50 On the one hand, the concrete manu-
the defendant's motion to dismiss the tort claims that were based on principles of
the ELR. See id. The second district reversed and remanded with instructions for
the trial court to enter summary judgment for the defendant. See id.
Similarly, in John Brown Automation, Inc. v. Nobles, 537 So. 2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988), the plaintiff sued the defendant on several causes of action, including
breach of contract, breach of implied warranties, intentional and negligent mis-
representation for failure to deliver machines and tooling in a timely fashion. See
id. at 616. The misrepresentation claim was predicated on statements that all
machine parts were on hand. See id. at 617. The second district ruled that the trial
court erred in not dismissing the tort actions based on the ELR, as any economic
loss sustained arose from the defendant's breach of contract. See id. at 617-18; see
also Hoseline, Inc. v. USA Diversified Prods., Inc., 40 F.3d 1198, 1199 (lth Cir.
1994) (banning civil theft and fraud claims); Ginsberg v. Lennar Fla. Holdings,
Inc., 645 So. 2d 490, 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (barring claims for conversion
and civil theft under Florida's RICO statute); Strickland-Collins Constr. v. Barnett
Bank of Naples, 545 So. 2d 476, 478 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (granting summary
judgment for lender in negligence action by contractor for lender's liability arising
from owner's misapplication of construction funds, because claim involved only
economic loss and litigants were parties to contract which allocated these risks of
loss; ELR applied between parties in privity, even though plaintiff did not assert
breach of contract claim); Belle Plaza Condominium Ass'n v. B.C.E. Dev., Inc., 543
So. 2d 239, 240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (granting summary judgment against
condominium association for claims of developer's negligent construction and
negligent performance of statutory duty to disclose because association sought
compensation for purely economic loss without damages for personal injury or
damage to property other than defective property itself).
46. 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993). For a further discussion of Casa Clara, see
generally Robert Alfert, Jr., Architect's Relief Act of 1993: The Legacy of Casa Clara
Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, 69 FLA. BJ. 36 (1995); Lynn
E. Wagner & Richard A. Solomon, Finally a Concrete Decision: The Supreme Court of
Florida Ends the Confusion Surrounding the Economic Loss Doctrine, 68 FLA. B.J. 46
(1994).
47. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1245.
48. See id.
49. See id. (recognizing tort remedy as attractive because it permits recovery of
greater damages and may avoid conditions of contract).
50. See id. at 124546 (addressing applicability of ELR that denies tort recovery
for homeowners).
1997]
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facturer simply argued that because the homeowners had suffered
no personal injury or property damage, they could state no cause of
action in tort.5 1 The homeowners, on the other hand, stated that
they had been harmed by the manufacturer's negligence, and thus,
deserved compensation. 52 The homeowners argued that damage to
their homes was "other damage" under the ELR, so as to give them
the latitude to sue in tort.53 They also argued that the existence of
a tort remedy should not turn on the character of the loss because
the concrete's dangerous condition created substantial risk of other
harm occurring.54
The Florida Supreme Court, with two partial dissents, mechani-
cally applied the ELR.55 The only obstacle that the majority saw was
the homeowner's argument that they had in fact suffered "property
damage" by virtue of the fact that their homes were crumbling.56
Relying on East River, the Florida Supreme Court stated that the
concrete was, like the generators, nothing more than a component
of the home. 57 Hence, damage to the home did not constitute the
"other property damage" necessary to state a tort claim. 58 There-
fore, the ELR barred the homeowners' tort claims against the con-
crete manufacturer. 59
The Florida Supreme Court went on to note that its decision
did not leave the claimants without a remedy. 60 To the contrary,
the homeowners had recourse against the prior owners who sold
them their property and with whom there was the opportunity to
contract, and hence, protect themselves against such risk.61 In fact,
the court in Casa Clara went so far as to suggest that the homeown-
51. See id. at 1245. To do otherwise, the concrete manufacturer suggested,
would subject suppliers in its situation to endless liability. See id. at 1247. The
concrete manufacturer said instead that the homeowners should look to the previ-
ous owners and sue on their home warranties. See id.
52. See id. at 1246-47 (addressing arguments that homeowners should be ex-
cepted from operation of ELR).
53. See id. at 1247.
54. See id. The homeowners urged that they deserved special status because a
home is the most substantial investment that most individuals make. See id.
55. See id. at 1248 (prohibiting tort recovery when economic loss is accompa-
nied by no personal injury or property damage other than to product itself).
56. See id. at 1247.
57. See id. (stating that purchasers bargained for finished product, not
components).
58. See id. (noting that house comprised one finished product).
59. See id. at 1248 (finding that ELR excludes recovery if there is no personal
injury or other property damage).
60. See id. at 1247 (stating that actions should have been contract actions).
61. See id.
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ers were the most efficient bearers of the risk of the concrete
disintegrating. 62
In light of Casa Clara, it became evident that Florida courts
would apply the ELR very broadly to bar tort actions for economic
loss even in the absence of privity between the claimant and the
alleged wrongdoer.63 With the scope of Florida's ELR in place, this
Article can now examine and critique how Florida has applied the
ELR, not to products liability tort claims, but instead to breach of
fiduciary claims. 64
62. Id. This analysis exalts form over substance and, the court's efficiency ar-
guments aside, seems quite inefficient. The court may have set in motion quite a
string of lawsuits for breach of warranty that will culminate with the manufacturer
being sued. It seems better to permit the homeowner a direct action to reduce
transaction costs and conserve judicial resources. The mere fact that one can con-
tract to protect oneself, through insurance or otherwise, does not justify turning
the law of torts on its head so that rational actions against negligent producers are
foreclosed. It certainly undermines the incentive that would otherwise exist to
carefully manufacture concrete. This result, however, was the product of applying
the ELR devoid of its policy base. In effect, it begins to erode worthy causes of
action in tort because of an inappropriate fixation on the existence of some or any
privity with anyone and a special kind of property damage.
63. See, e.g., Sfc Valve Corp. v. Wright Mach. Corp., 883 F. Supp. 710, 714
(S.D. Fla. 1995) (interpreting Casa Clara as abolishing "no alternative remedy" ex-
ception to Florida's ELR). In another effort to clarify things, the Florida Supreme
Court reentered the fray in Airport Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Prevost Car, Inc., 660 So. 2d
628 (Fla. 1995). This decision was, in essence, an affirmance of the court's deci-
sions in Casa Clara and the 1987 trilogy of Florida Power, Aetna Life and AFM. First,
the court recognized a very narrow "no alternative theory of recovery" exception to
the ELR. See id. at 631. The court said that the case giving rise to such an excep-
tion was one in which an architect allegedly had failed to adequately supervise a
general contractor. See id. The key was supervisory responsibilities, and absent
these, the exception did not apply. As the instant case was devoid of any such
allegations, the general rule prevailed to bar a tort action in which the only dam-
age was to the defective product itself. See id. Second, the court noted that despite
damage caused "by a sudden calamitous event," without physical injury or property
damage, there simply could be no tort recovery. See id. at 631-32. Third, without
the requisite harm, a failure to warn claim would not circumvent the ELR, espe-
cially when the alleged failure occurred subsequent to the manufacture of the
product and the formation of any contract. See id. at 632.
64. See, e.g., Streiff Jewelry Co. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 341,
343-44 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (using ELR to bar breach of fiduciary duty claim), vacated,
679 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Fla. 1988). A few years later in Kee v. National Reserve Life
Insurance Co., 918 F. 2d 1538, 1543 (11th Cir. 1990), the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reached the same conclusion as the court in StreiffJewelby. Id. In Kee, an
insurance agent had a contract with an insurance company by which he was to
receive commissions for policies he sold. See id. at 1539-40. Kee allegedly induced
customers to buy policies by paying the first year's premiums himself and applying
the customer's payment to give them a second year of coverage. See id. at 1540.
The fact that Kee's commission was greater than the first year's premium made
this scheme profitable. See id.
Upon learning of the scheme, the insurance company terminated Kee. See id.
Litigation ensued and Kee asserted claims for an accounting for commissions
owed, breach of contract, breach of implied covenant, conversion and conspiracy.
1997]
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2. The ELR and Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims in Florida
Perhaps the most recognized decision in Florida regarding the
applicability of the ELR to a breach of fiduciary duty claim is the
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in Interstate Securities Corp. v. Hayes Corp.6 5 Hayes entered into
three contracts with Interstate, a brokerage firm, which enabled
Hayes to trade various options and commodities through an Inter-
state margin account.66 Interstate imposed a condition on the mar-
gin trading requiring that the President of Hayes execute a written,
See id. The insurance company counterclaimed for breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, negligence, fraud, intentional misrepresentation and negligence
per se. See id. Kee moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the tort
claims were not separate from the breach of contract claim. See id. Kee aligned
himself with another entity, CTL Insurance Corporation, because Kee had as-
signed his rights to this entity. See id. The district court found that the insurance
company failed to establish any of the tort counts and granted Kee's motion. See
id. Likewise, it granted the insurance company's summary judgment motion with
respect to all counts. See id. Kee appealed the entry of summaryjudgment only on
his claims for accounting, conversion and conspiracy. See id. His appeal was unsuc-
cessful, as the court affirmed the district court's adverse ruling on these claims. See
id. at 1541-42.
It was in connection with the insurance company's appeal that the court con-
fronted the issues surrounding.the ELR. See id. at 1543. The court began by not-
ing "that the mere existence of a contract claim does not automatically vitiate all
causes of action in tort." Id. The court stated, however, that there had to be
wrongful conduct, beyond the breach of contract, amounting to an independent
tort. See id.
The court then turned its focus to the damages allegedly suffered by the insur-
ance company. See id. The counterclaim stated:
"[The Insurance Company] was and has been damaged as set forth
in paragraph 22 above." Paragraph 22 sets out the damages for the
breach of contract claim which include money paid in commissions and
bonuses, expenses in processing applications, risk of indemnity, and loss
of use of its money. These are, of course, all losses flowing from the con-
tractual breach. "Where the compensatory damages requested in a count
for tort are identical to the compensatory damages sought in a count for
breach of contract, compensatory damages and punitive damages for the
tort are not recoverable."
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Rosen v. Marlin, 486 So. 2d 623, 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986)). The Kee court, consequently, affirmed the grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of Kee on the insurance company's tort claims. See id. at 1544. The
court did not separately address the breach of fiduciary duty claim, but instead
lumped it with the others. As a result, little can be gleaned from Kee.
65. 920 F.2d 769 (1lth Cir. 1991). It may be the case that prior to Interstate
Securities, scholars and practitioners had just assumed that Kee was an aberration.
Be that as it may, Interstate Securities has been sharply criticized. See, e.g., James G.
Dodrill, II, Note, Interstate Securities Corp. v. Hayes Corp.: Should the Economic
Loss Doctrine Apply to Actions Against Fiduciaries?, 47 U. MiAMi L. REV. 1193, 1220
(1993) ("Although the economic loss doctrine is appropriate in actions involving
product liability and some service contracts, the doctrine's rationale breaks down
when expanded to cover relationships involving fiduciary duties.").
66. See Interstate Securities, 920 F.2d at 770 (commenting on contractual rela-
tions between Hayes and Interstate).
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personal guaranty of the obligations on the corporate account.6 7
Hayes, through its President, engaged in a considerable amount of
risky trading on the Interstate account.68 Ultimately, Hayes suf-
fered huge losses on this account and Interstate sued to recover the
amount owed after liquidation of the account.69 Hayes's counter-
claims against Interstate included a breach of fiduciary duty
claim. 70 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit framed the issue:
Because no personal injury or property damage oc-
curred in this case, the issue is whether, as a matter of
Florida law, breach of fiduciary duty is the kind of tort that
is foreclosed between parties to a contract under AFM or
whether it constitutes a tort separate and independent
from an accompanying breach of contract.71
To resolve this issue of Florida law, the Eleventh Circuit looked
to J. Batten Corp. v. Oakridge Investment 85 Ltd.,72 which, under the
ELR, barred what appeared to be a claim of fraud in the induce-
ment.7 3 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that, if the ELR bars a fraud
claim under Florida law, the ELR must likewise prohibit a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty, especially when the parties were in privity
67. See id. ("Before agreeing to permit Hayes Corporation to trade on margin,
Interstate required Roger Haendiges, the president and sole shareholder of Hayes,
to execute a written personal guaranty to cover any obligations incurred by the
account.").
68. See id. at 771 (discussing Haendiges's writing of uncovered options
through its Interstate account).
69. See id. at 772 (noting that Hayes allegedly owed Interstate $1,867,061 after
liquidation of Hayes's account).
70. See id. (summarizing Hayes's counterclaims against Interstate, which in-
cluded breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent handing of accounts
and allegation that Interstate violated Regulation T, which governs issuance of
credit by securities firms to investors trading on margin).
71. Id. at 776 (determining if, under Florida law, breach of fiduciary duty is
type of tort that is foreclosed between contracting parties or whether it constitutes
separate and independent tort from breach of contract).
72. 546 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
73. Id. at 69 (affirming trial court's dismissal of fraud claim based on ELR). A
general contractor sued a property owner in a construction project under a
mechanic's lien and asserted additional claims for breach of contract and fraud.
See id. at 68-69. The lien claim alleged that the owner owed money on the project.
See id. at 69. The fraud claim alleged that the owner refused to pay for certain
work and then induced the contractor to complete construction based on the
owner's fraudulent representation that it would pay the amount due. See id. The
trial court dismissed the fraud claim at the pleading stage based on ELR. See id.
The appellate court affirmed. See id.
1997]
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and no relationship would have existed but for the contracts.74
Thus, the court in Interstate Securities concluded that because of ap-
plication of the ELR, the court should have dismissed the appel-
lants claim for breach of fiduciary duty.75 This reasoning is
dubious. A breach of fiduciary duty claim should not suffer the
same fate simply because the ELR barred a fraud claim asserted
under different facts.7 6 In addition, just because a fiduciary is in
privity with someone does not mean that the fiduciary should auto-
matically be responsible merely for breach of contract. 77 Further-
more, as it turns out, the Florida Supreme Court ultimately ruled
several years after Interstate Securities that the ELR did not bar fraud
in the inducement claims.7 8 Thus, the very foundation upon which
the Interstate Securities court relied is no longer valid.79
74. See Interstate Securities, 920 F.2d at 777 (stating that, under Florida law,
both fraud claims and breach of fiduciary duty claims are foreclosed under AFM
doctrine when claims are based solely on contractual relationship).
75. Id. (distinguishing appellant's case from those allowing for recovery for
pure economic loss when there was no alternative means of recovery).
76. Indeed, the duty imposed on a fiduciary is among the highest imposed by
law. One might think that a court would go to great lengths to try to preserve such
a claim.
77. Such a rule threatens to absolve him, at least in substantial part, from a
rank breach of fiduciary duty. There is simply no reasoned basis to insulate a
wrongdoer in this way. Likewise, there is no valid reason to strip the innocent
victim of valuable remedies, such as damages proximately caused or punitive dam-
ages, solely because he or she is in privity with the tortfeasing fiduciary. This serves
no one other than the self-serving fiduciary.
78. See generally HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, 685 So. 2d 1238,
1240 (Fla. 1996) (holding that fraudulent inducement is independent tort from
breach of contract and is not barred by ELR); Woodson v. Martin, 685 So. 2d 1240,
1241 (Fla. 1996) (quashing appellate court's decision that fraud in inducement
claims were barred by Florida's ELR). Prior to this decision, commentators in
Florida had sharply criticized the line of case law holding that the ELR barred
fraud in the inducement claims. See, e.g., Theresa Montalbano Bennett, Lies and
Broken Promises: Fraud and the Economic Loss Rule after Woodson v. Martin, 70 FLA.
B.J. 46, 47-48 (1996) (discussing policy reasons for allowing fraud claims arising
from contractual relationships under ELR).
79. See Interstate Securities, 920 F.2d at 776-77 (reasoning that if fraud claims
between parties to contract are barred by ELR under Florida law, breach of fiduci-
ary duty claims would be as well). In other words, Interstate Securities, a case decided
by a federal court attempting to apply federal law, was decided based upon a prem-
ise that the Florida Supreme Court ultimately held was erroneous. Therefore, a
strong argument can be made that Interstate Securities should no longer be good
law. Unfortunately, Interstate Securities became a favorite weapon of defense lawyers
as soon as the decision came down. See Moro-Romero v. Prudential Bache Sec.,
Inc., No. 89-1821-CIV, 1991 WL 494175, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 1991) (applying
Interstate Securities blindly to bar breach of fiduciary duty claim involving fraud by
account executive who gave plaintiff worthless certificate of deposit in exchange
for approximately $600,000 of plaintiff's funds that account executive transferred
to himself).
The Eleventh Circuit had another chance to consider the application of Flor-
ida's ELR in BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Painewebber, Inc., 955 F.2d 1467 (11th
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Shortly thereafter, a federal district court in Florida considered
the application of the ELR in a fiduciary context. In City of Miami
Firefighters' & Police Officers' Retirement Trust v. Invesco Management,
Inc.,80 the plaintiff, a trust, entered into an agreement with the de-
fendant to have the defendant serve as an investment advisor for
the trust.81 Count I of the trust's complaint sought compensatory
damages based on a tort theory and reserved the right to seek puni-
tive damages.82 The defendant moved to dismiss Count I,.asserting
that the ELR barred it.83
The court began with a summary of Florida's ELR. It stated
the general rule that "no independent tort can exist solely for con-
tractually based economic damages, absent personal injury or dam-
age to property other than that which was subject to the contract. 84
The court also noted that the rule provides an exception for claim-
Cir. 1992). The dispute in BankAtlantic arose out of Painewebber's service as a
broker and financial advisor on two interest rate swaps with another savings and
loan. See id. at 1469. The transactions proved to be less than satisfactory to
BankAtlantic and it sued Painewebber for failing to make adequate disclosures
concerning the deals. See id. at 1470. BankAtlantic brought claims for breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligence and
negligent misrepresentation. See id. The case went to trial and the jury ruled in
favor of Painewebber. See id. On appeal, one of Painewebber's arguments was that
BankAtlantic's entire appeal was moot, citing AFM and Interstate Securities. See id. at
1476. BankAtlantic countered with the assertion that Painewebber had consist-
ently taken the contrary position that the interest rate swaps were outside the
scope of the contract and, thus, not subject to the ELR. See id. At that point, prior
to the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Casa Clara, this argument was easier to
make. See Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc.,
620 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Fla. 1993) (applying ELR very broadly under Florida law).
Indeed, after Casa Clara, the lack of privity or whether conduct is outside the scope
of a contract may no longer prevent the application of the ELR. See id. The Elev-
enth Circuit held Painewebber to its former position and concluded that Interstate
Securities and the ELR did not bar BankAtlantic's claims. BankAtlantic, 955 F.2d at
1476.
The fact that the parties had been operating on the premise that these claims
were outside the contract seemed to make for an easy case and rightly so. If the
claims were outside the contract, then it seems that there would be no opportunity
to bargain with respect to them or to allocate losses. Hence, the need for the ELR
to protect the contractual expectations of the parties is diminished. No one can
try ex post to distort the bargaining process through an assertion of a tort claim.
80. 789 F. Supp. 392 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
81. See id. at 393. The agreement specified that the defendant would only be
liable for diminution in the value of the trust caused by the defendant's "negli-
gence, willful misconduct, or lack of good faith." Id. Defendant's stock trades, on
behalf of the trust, resulted in a loss to the trust, and the trust sued to recover. See
id.
82. See id. (contending that Invesco's wanton, willful and reckless speculation
in Texas Air resulted in $417,338.89 in damages and another $1,252,016.67 in pu-
nitive damages and attorneys' fees).
83. See id.
84. Id.
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ants who do not have a contractual remedy.8 5 The court then pro-
ceeded to apply this rule and exception. 6
The court analyzed Count I of the plaintiffs complaint and
concluded that it resembled a claim for breach of fiduciary duty,
despite its not being labeled as such. 87 Hence, the court dismissed
the claim because the claim for fiduciary duty was dependent on
the existence of the contract and the claim did not include any as-
sertions of personal injury or property damage.88 Finally, the court
noted that the trust was not without a remedy because the agree-
ment provided a means of redress.8 9
The court's rationale is easily understood. It ignores, however,
the classic policy justifications for claims of breach of fiduciary duty
and the heightened duties of care and loyalty that accompany
them.90 Traditionally, society has sought to reinforce such relation-
ships, not just through compensatory means, but deterrent means
as well. 91 Here, the court foreclosed possible full compensation
and any opportunity for punitive damages, but in so doing, did not
address whether the alleged breach of duty justified consideration
of other policies beyond the parties' contract.92
85. See id. at 393-94 ("Thus, it seems clear that invocation of the rule preclud-
ing tort claims for only economic losses applies only when there are alternative
theories of recovery better suited to compensate the damaged party for a peculiar
kind of loss."). Of course, this observation may no longer be correct in light of
, Casa Clara's holding and given the fact that Casa Clara expressly disapproved of
Latite Roofing v. Urbanek, 588 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). Casa Clara
Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1248
(Fla. 1993). If one reads Casa Clara to say that the ELR applies as long as there is
"a contract in the vicinity," this exception to the ELR may no longer have vitality.
86. See City of Miami Firefighters', 789 F. Supp. at 394 (granting Invesco's mo-
tion to dismiss trust's tort claim for damages resulting from alleged speculation).
87. See id. This fiduciary duty allegedly arose under statute as well as contract.
See id. The court saw the case as the factual equivalent of Interstate Securities and
stated that, in that case, no duty arose until the parties entered into the investment
advisor agreement. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 394-95 (noting that plaintiffs can still bring breach of contract
action). Hence, the exception did not apply to enable the breach of fiduciary duty
claim to escape the ELR's application.
90. See, e.g., Atlantic Nat'l Bank of Fla. v. Vest, 480 So. 2d 1328, 1332-33 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (describing nature of, and duties within, fiduciary
relationship).
91. See generally Wagman v. Lee, 457 A.2d 401, 405 (D.C. 1983) (awarding
punitive damages as form of deterrent in breach of fiduciary duty claims); Mulder
v. Mittelstadt, 352 N.W.2d 223, 229 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) ("The remedy employed
here is one that would prevent the same controversy in the future.").
92. See City of Miami Firefighters', 789 F. Supp. at 394 (failing to address policy
reasons justifying compensation beyond damages for breach of contract).
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This is especially troubling when, as in this case, the parties
clearly intended and expressed in their contract that the defendant
should not escape responsibility for his negligence, willful miscon-
duct or bad faith.93 The reference to the common law tort con-
cepts within the contract suggests that the parties may have been
relying on these tort concepts to fill the gaps in their contracts. 94
Instead, their words had the ironic effect of foreclosing those
claims. 95
93. See id. at 393 ("Section 8 of the Agreement states that '[t]he General In-
vestment Advisor [Invesco] shall not be liable for ... any loss to or dimunition of
the property in the Account, except such as is due to its own negligence, willful
misconduct, or lack of good faith."').
94. See id. For a discussion of the tort concepts referred to in the trust agree-
ment, see supra note 93 and accompanying text.
95. See City of Miami Firefighters', 789 F. Supp. at 394-95 (holding that ELR
barred breach of fiduciary duty claim because such claim depended on existence
of contract). The same court revisited whether the ELR barred claims for breach
of fiduciary duty in Bender v. Centrust Mortgage Corp., 833 F. Supp. 1525 (S.D. Fla.
1992). In Bender, the plaintiff was the president of a mortgage company who sued
on a variety of claims arising out of his alleged employment relationship. Id. at
1527. The mortgage company was a subsidiary of a bank taken over by the Resolu-
tion Trust Company ("RTC"). See id. The RTC repudiated the plaintiffs employ-
ment contract on behalf of the bank and the plaintiff sought to impose liability on
the subsidiary mortgage company. See id. The court considered the defendant's
motion to dismiss the complaint, which included several counts for breach of con-
tract, one for breach of fiduciary duty, one for tortious interference and one for
imposition of a constructive trust. See id. at 1527-28.
The court let stand the plaintiffs contract theories, requiring a more definite
statement with respect to one. See id. at 1532-36. Despite this, the court also al-
lowed to stand the claim for breach of fiduciary duty arising out of the defendants'
alleged setting aside of funds to pay the plaintiff. See id. at 1535-36. Ironically, the
court stated that "[the d]efendant [had] provided no authority suggesting that
[p]laintiff substantively [could] raise no breach of fiduciary duty claim, or that
procedurally this claim [was] not properly raised." Id. (citing AFM and Interstate
Securities for this proposition). Unfortunately, the court did not explain why it be-
lieved these cases supported its decision. This would have been helpful, especially
because these cases generally stand for the contrary position that the ELR would
bar such a claim.
Such inconsistency from the court is remarkable, especially in light of the un-
derlying facts. While the facts in City of Miami Firefighters' seemed to offer more
hope for a breach of fiduciary duty claim on their face, employment relationships,
as a general rule, offer less, especially to the employee/agent because the agent
generally is not the beneficiary of fiduciary duties from the principal. See W. ED-
WARD SELL, SELL ON AGENCY 2 (1975) ("The agency relationship is essentially a
fiduciary relationship, in which the agent agrees to act primarily for the benefit of
the principal in connection with the matters he is to transact or services he is to
perform."). Moreover, an employment contract nearly always contemplates an em-
ployee's pay. Another way to look at this case would be to say that the plaintiff
simply was not paid, constituting merely a breach of the employment contract,
which he had the opportunity to bargain for and protect himself against. Viewed
from this perspective, the court could have held that the parties simply did not
stand in a fiduciary relationship. Resort to the ELR to bar the fiduciary duty claim
would then have been unnecessary.
1997]
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This issue again arose on a motion to dismiss before the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holland & Knight.96  The complaint,
brought by the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC"), alleged that
legal work by the defendant resulted in the failure to file a lawsuit
for breach of a guaranty agreement executed by one of the bank's
principals and a related entity.97 RTC claimed that the law firm
"was both incompetent and disloyal in its representation of [its cli-
ent, the bank]" and favored the bank's principals over the bank.98
Based on the ELR, the defendant law firm sought to dismiss the
second count of a two-count complaint for "legal malpractice-negli-
gence" and breach of fiduciary duty.99
In Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Atlantic Travel Service, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D.
Fla. 1993), the same beleaguered court looked at another motion to dismiss impli-
cating the ELR. See id. at 1167. The plaintiff was an agency of certain air carriers
and, in that capacity, provided services relating to airline ticketing. See id. The
defendant, a travel agency, entered into an agreement with the plaintiff, authoriz-
ing the plaintiff to purchase tickets from the defendant and, in turn, sell them to
the public. See id. The defendants failed to pay for some tickets. See id. In addi-
tion to suing for breach of contract, the plaintiff also alleged breach of fiduciary
duty, conversion, fraud and negligence. See id. The defendants sought to dismiss
the tort counts, asserting they were barred by the ELR. See id.
The court began again with a brief statement of the rule and noted the exist-
ence of an exception when no alternative contractual remedy existed. See id. at
1168. The court reviewed Interstate and AFM and then applied them to the instant
facts. See id. at 1168-69. The court stated that the plaintiff's tort claims were not
"independent or distinguishable" from the contract claims. Id. at 1169. Moreover,
the court observed that the plaintiffs claims were "solely for economic damages
flowing from [the] alleged breach of contract." Id. Given these findings, the court
easily dealt with the plaintiff's arguments in opposition. See id. The first was that
the ELR could not bar the claims against the defendant's agent because he was not
a party to the contract. See id. The court rejected this proposition, stating that the
agent was sued in his agency capacity and that his allegedly wrongful conduct was
no different than that alleged in the breach of contract claim. See id.
The second argument was in essence one that an independent tort had, in
fact, been alleged. See id. The court, however, easily distinguished the cited prece-
dent because it involved property damage, not mere economic loss as in the case
before the court. See id. Hence, the court dismissed this argument. See id. Finally,
the plaintiff argued that even if the ELR barred tort claims, that it should nonethe-
less be able to recover punitive damages. See id. The court also rejected this, citing
well established Florida law that punitive damages are unavailable in breach of
contract actions. See id. Having considered and rejected all of the plaintiffs argu-
ments, the court dismissed all tort claims. See id.
96. 832 F. Supp. 1528 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
97. See id. at 1530 (claiming that Holland & Knight's conclusion that wrong-
doing bank's director and related entity had no liability under guarantee agree-
ment resulted in corporate committee's abstention from filing suit against
wrongdoers).
98. Id. (alleging counts of legal malpractice, negligence and breach of fiduci-
ary duty).
99. See id. (addressing argument that breach of fiduciary duty is not in-
dependent tort and is barred by ELR).
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The court began its analysis by looking to Rule (8) (e) (2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in relevant part:
A party may set forth two or more statements of a
claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, either in
one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses.
When two or more statements are made in the alternative
and one of them if made independently would be suffi-
cient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insuffi-
ciency of one or more of the alternative statements.100
Based on its reading, the court concluded that the RTC had merely
taken advantage of this rule and that the two counts were not dupli-
cative, but instead represented two distinct theories of malpractice,
which were permissibly pled in the alternative. 10 1 The court then
addressed the law firm's argument that the ELR barred the RTC's
breach of fiduciary duty claim. 10 2
The court said that it was not clear whether, under Florida law,
a malpractice action is a tort or contract claim. 10 3 Hence, the court
fell back on its conclusion that, both counts were for legal malprac-
tice, pled in the alternative, and that irrespective of their nature as
contracts or torts, the ELR was not a bar.10 4 Accordingly, the court
denied the motion to dismiss. 0 5
The court here did several important things. First, in the face
of considerable precedent, the court nonetheless declined to apply
the ELR, recognizing that different policies are possibly at play in
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
101. See Holland & Knight, 832 F. Supp. at 1531-32 (applying Rule 8(e) (2) of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to plaintiff's complaint).
102. See id. at 1532. The law firm's argument was predicated on the assertion
that the first count of the complaint, that denominated as "legal malpractice-negli-
gence," was really a claim for breach of contract. See id.' Because there was no
claim for personal injury or property damage, the law firm asserted that, in light of
the contract remedy, the ELR was a bar to the breach of fiduciary duty claim. See
id. The law firm cast its argument in terms of both the ELR and the independent
tort doctrine. See id. The latter is intimately related to the former and states that
'there must be a tort 'distinguishable from or independent of the breach of con-
tract.'" AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla.
1987) (quoting Lewis v. Guthartz, 428 So. 2d 222, 224 (Fla. 1982)).
103. See Holland & Knight, 832 F. Supp. at 1532; see also Kartikes v. Demos, 214
So. 2d 86, 86-87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (stating that client has cause of action in
contract for negligent performance).
104. See Holland & Knight, 832 F. Supp. at 1532 (finding that ELR was not
applicable to alternative tort or contract claims). In a footnote following this state-
ment, the court noted that the ELR had yet to be applied in the legal malpractice
context, and that it was derived from the very different context of commercial
litigation. See id. at 1532 n.7.
105. See id. at 1531-32.
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the products liability context than in the legal malpractice con-
text.106 Malpractice claims often traditionally sound in negligence
and, at the same time, recognize the public interest in reinforcing
the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship.10 7 Addition-
ally, economic loss may oftentimes be the sole, but substantial, in-
jury suffered by the client. For these reasons, extension of the ELR
to the malpractice context makes little sense.'08
Second, the court's decision illustrates another troubling as-
pect of the ELR. The ELR is often invoked at the motion to dismiss
stage before a plaintiff has had the opportunity to develop its case
through discovery. 10 9 This may have led the court in Holland &
Knight to rule as it did.1 10 From a defendant's perspective, however,
a motion to dismiss based on the ELR provides a marvelous oppor-
106. See id. at 1532.
107. See id. ("[T]he [c]ourt has concluded that [malpractice] claims ...
sound in tort.").
108. See id. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes pleading
in the alternative without regard to the sufficiency or consistency of other claims.
FED. R. Clv. P. 8(a), (e); see also Holland &Knight, 832 F. Supp. at 1531-32 (permit-
ting plaintiff to seek inconsistent remedies under Rule 8 and, therefore, not elect
between them at pleading stage); 2AJAMES WM. MooRE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 8.32 (2d ed. 1996) (same); 5 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FED. PRAc. & PROC. 532-33 (2d ed. 1990) (abrogating "theory of pleadings" doc-
trine that required plaintiff to seek, and be awarded, recovery on only one theory).
Finally, it rejects the "weaker link" doctrine that provided a basis for declaring an
entire pleading defective if one alternative was inadequately pled. See id. at 543-44
(noting procedure consistent with policy to promote efficiency in pleading and
resolution of disputes on merits, not technical deficiencies).
109. See, e.g., Michelle Kirstin Hart, Note, Tort or Contract?: New Jersey's Simulta-
neous Expansion and Dilution of Contract Theory, 26 RUTGERS LJ. 495, 515 (1995).
Hart noted:
Furthermore, significant procedural differences exist between con-
tract and tort claims. If a cause of action is labeled a contract claim,
plaintiffs often will have a shorter statute of limitations period. Defend-
ants, faced with disproving negligence in a contract case, will not have the
benefit of contributory negligence or statutory contribution rights to re-
duce damages. In addition, plaintiffs who have to sue in contract to re-
cover for a tortious injury will be unable to recover damages for mental
distress. Since tort law generally places less restrictions on plaintiffs, it is
thought to be more advantageous.... The better course is to allow both
contract and tort claims to be brought as independent causes of action
rather than to ban tort claims that arise in contractual relationships.
Plaintiffs will then have the opportunity, or the burden, of alleging and
proving facts to support their claims individually. This kind of legal classi-
fication leads to a more efficient, logical and rational system and will bet-
ter serve all parties.
Id. (footnote omitted).
110. Holland &Knight, 832 F. Supp. at 1528 (holding that plaintiff's malprac-
tice claims were permissibly pled in alternative, and therefore, neither ELR nor
independent tort doctrine applied).
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tunity to whittle down a complaint to a less threatening contract
action.'1
111. See, e.g., First Union Discount Brokerage Servs., Inc. v. Milos, 997 F.2d
835, 844 (11th Cir. 1993) (revisiting ELR in Eleventh Circuit). This case involved a
complicated brokerage transaction between an investor and a discount brokerage
house. See id. at 839. In connection with the transaction, the investor signed a
margin agreement with the brokerage firm that gave the brokerage firm "full dis-
cretion to protect [itself] by liquidating the [investor's] securities positions without
notice." Id. This agreement was executed after the investor expressed concerns
that he might not be able to monitor his considerable positions while he vaca-
tioned in Russia. See id. Near the same time, an agent of the brokerage firm told
the investor that he would have thirty days following his return from vacation, until
November 15, 1987, to cure any margin problems arising from the investor's writ-
ing of risky put options. See id.
Subsequently, the investor vacationed in Russia from September 28 to Octo-
ber 14, 1987, during which time the stock market went into a decline. See id. Mar-
gin calls on the investor's account were issued, but not enforced. See id. In fact,
there was confusion as to whether the calls were a mistake, resulting from difficul-
ties that the brokerage firm's clearing broker was having supplying timely and ac-
curate account information. See id. at 839-40. When the investor went to the
brokerage firm on October 16 after returning from Russia, it appeared that his
account was in order and adequate; but, in reality, it was actually overstated by a
considerable amount. See id.
As bad luck would have it, the stock market crashed on October 19, generat-
ing a huge margin call in the investor's account. See id. at 840. The brokerage firm
demanded that the investor meet the call immediately. See id. When the investor
maintained he had an extension through November 15th, the brokerage firm
claimed that the agent making that agreement lacked authority. See id. When the
investor refused to meet the call, the brokerage firm liquidated the account and
asserted a deficiency. See id.
Despite a notice to do so, the investor never objected to the deficiency. See id.
The brokerage firm sued to recover the deficiency and the investor counter-
claimed. See id. The counterclaim included one count alleging breach of contract,
two counts alleging statutory violations and three counts alleging tort claims of
common law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence. See id. at 840-41.
The brokerage firm moved for summary judgment on its complaint and the
investor's counterclaim. See id. at 841. It was in consideration of the counterclaim
that the court discussed the ELR. See id. at 844. The court dismissed the counter-
claim because it believed that reliance on false representations were essential to
each count and that either there were no such statements, or if there were any, no
reasonable reliance on them. See id. at 844-47.
By doing so, the court avoided what would have been an considerable diffi-
culty associated with applying the ELR to the investor's complaint. See id. at 844
n.14. Instead, the court relegated its discussion of this to a footnote. See id. It
offered the ELR only as an "additional obstacle" to the investor's recovery under
the breach of fiduciary duty and negligence counts. Id. After laying out the facts
of Interstate Securities, the court simply said, "[s]imilarly, the [investor] cannot re-
cover under [a] negligence or breach of fiduciary duty claim." Id.
The approach taken by the court in its opinion seems more analytically sound
than the ELR alternative presented in the footnote. The court assessed the claims
and found essential elements missing. See id. at 844-47. This approach is superior
to wading unnecessarily into the murky waters of the ELR and does not require a
foreclosure of legitimate remedies at the pleading stage.
19971
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The Eleventh Circuit once again had to deal with the ELR in
Jones v. Childers. 12 The plaintiff, a professional football player, sued
his agent and financial advisor, a corporation and its sole share-
holder, for fraud, negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduci-
ary duty and Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization
Act (RICO) 113 violations.1 14 On appeal, the defendants argued,
among other things, that Florida's ELR barred the plaintiff's tort
claims, including the claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 115
The shareholder defendant argued that the course of dealing
between the plaintiff and himself constituted an implied contract, if
not an express one. 1 6 The court, however, stated that to suggest an
implied contract was to misunderstand Florida law, which essen-
tially uses such fiction only to prevent unjust enrichment." 7 With-
out further discussion of the ELR, the court held that the ELR did
not bar the remaining tort claims and the claim for breach of fidu-
ciary duty against the shareholder defendant.118
Interestingly, what saved the plaintiff here was the fortuity of
dealing with a sole shareholder with whom he was not in privity,
having contracted with the corporation instead. Under a technical
reading of Casa Clara, however, the Eleventh Circuit could have
112. 18 F.3d 899 (lth Cir. 1994).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (a)-(d) (1994).
114. See Jones, 18 F. 3d at 901. The district court found in favor of the plaintiff
and made both a compensatory and punitive damage award. See id. The defend-
ants appealed. See id. The plaintiff had entered into a management contract with
the defendant corporation. See id. Subsequently the shareholder defendant ad-
vised plaintiff to invest in a tax shelter and plaintiff followed his advice unaware of
the likelihood of a tax audit that was disclosed in a accompanying prospectus. See
id. at 902. After the plaintiff made a second investment in a related tax shelter, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sent the plaintiff a deficiency notice. See id. By the
time the deficiency notice was received, the investments had gone bad. See id.
Prior to this time, the shareholder defendant had assured plaintiff that an audit
was nothing to worry about and only a mere formality. See id.
115. See id. Prior to the trial, the district court had, on the basis of the ELR,
dismissed all the tort claims against the corporate defendant because the manage-
ment contract was between plaintiff and the corporate defendant. See id. at 904-05.
The court, however, did not dismiss the tort claims against the shareholder defend-
ant because he was not a party to the contract. See id. at 905.
116. See id. The court rejected this argument finding no legal or factual basis
for it. See id. The record was devoid of evidence of any contract other than the
management contract. See id.
117. See id. ("Unlike express contracts, which arise by mutual assent of the
parties, implied or quasi contracts are 'a fiction of the law, adopted to achieve
justice and enforce legal duties by means of an action ex contractu where no true
contract exists.'" (quoting 11 F A. JUR.2D CONTRACTS, § 236 (1979)).
118. See id. (finding that ELR does not bar Jones's tort claims against
Childers).
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barred the plaintiff's claims against the sole shareholder as well. 119
Because the court in Casa Clara applied the ELR, even in the ab-
sence of privity with the alleged wrongdoer, the court here could
have left the plaintiff with only his contractual claim against the
corporation. 120
If, however, the plaintiff had contracted with both the corpora-
tion and its principal, then it appears that the court would have
barred the plaintiffs tort remedies and claim for breach of fiduci-
ary duty.121 This technical distinction is not policy based, and
therefore, is fragile and problematic when the allegations fit our
traditional notions of fiduciary obligations. It is odd to think that
the likely inadvertent failure to contract with the trusted share-
holder is the determinative factor as to whether the ELR should
apply to bar a breach of fiduciary duty claim.1 22
119. Compare Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino &
Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1246-47 (Fla. 1993), with Jones, 18 F.3d at 901-05 (ques-
tioning scope of ELR based on policy reasons).
120. Indeed, the fact that there was a contract in the vicinity, i.e., between
plaintiff and the defendant corporation, may have been enough to bar tort claims
against the sole shareholder under the ELR.
121. See Interstate Sec. Corp. v. Hayes Corp., 920 F.2d 769, 776-77 (1lth Cir.
1991) (barring breach of fiduciary duty claim among parties to contract because
claim is not separate and independent tort, but rather dependent on existence of
contract); City of Miami Firefighters' & Police Officers' Retirement Trust v. In-
vesco Mgmt., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 392, 394 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (dismissing claim for
breach of fiduciary duty because claim is dependent on existence of contract and
noting that recovery is limited to breach of contract claim).
122. See, e.g., Audiotext Communications Network, Inc. v. U.S. Telecom, Inc.,
912 F. Supp. 469 (D. Kan. 1995). In Audiotext Communications, a federal district
court in Kansas found itself applying Florida law and struggling with the applica-
tion of the ELR. See id. at 475. The procedural posture was a motion for judgment
on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for summaryjudgment. See id. at 472. The
plaintiffs, information providers in the telecommunications industry, entered into
agreements with the defendants to purchase certain billing and collection services
from the defendants. See id. The plaintiffs alleged that defendants' conduct, both
prior to and throughout the contract period, was tortious. See id. at 472-73. De-
fendants allegedly did not provide accurate information regarding their services,
wrongfully withheld money and otherwise failed to provide effective service. See id.
The plaintiffs' complaint included claims of fraud, negligent misrepresenta-
tion, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. See id. at 473. In response,
defendants asserted that all of plaintiffs' tort claims were barred by the ELR. See id.
After determining that Florida law applied, the court looked at Interstate Securities
and AFM for guidance. See id. at 474. Although the plaintiffs asserted that their
claims for negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty were distinct
from the contract, the court believed they were the mirror image of the contract
claims. See id. at 475. Also, there were no allegations of personal injury or prop-
erty damage in the claims. See id. Hence, the court held these claims were barred
by the ELR. See id. Furthermore, while the court held that the plaintiffs' fraud in
the performance claims were barred by the ELR, the court permitted the plaintiffs'
fraud in the inducement claims to stand. See id.
1997]
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One could read the court's opinion to mean that it believed that the parties
did not stand in a fiduciary relationship, but merely a contractual one. It is also
possible to see the opinion as yet another mechanical application of the ELR, how-
ever, sans any of the traditional public policy analysis accompanying breach of fi-
duciary duty claims. If the underlying facts did not suggest such a relationship,
then no claim for breach of fiduciary duty was viable, irrespective of the ELR.
The Southern District of Florida looked at the issue in yet a different context
in Keys Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 897 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Fla. 1995), affid, 102
F.3d. 554 (11th Cir. 1996). The case was before the court on the defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment. See id. at 1440. The dispute arose out of a franchise
relationship between the plaintiff, an automobile dealership, and the defendant,
Chrysler Corporation, as franchiser. See id. The plaintiff also had a fiduciary ar-
rangement with another defendant, Chrysler Credit Corp. ("CCC"). See id. This
arrangement was known as a floorplan line of credit, and the advances made
under this line of credit were in CCC's discretion, as was the right to terminate the
arrangement. See id. The line of credit was secured by a security interest in the
financed vehicles. See id. If a financed car was sold, CCC would receive the
amount of the advance it had made on the vehicle immediately and the plaintiff
would hold the proceeds in trust for CCC. See id. at 1441. The plaintiff executed a
promissory note and provided additional security by way of an assignment of fac-
tory credits from the other defendant Chrysler to CCC. See id.
Subsequently, the plaintiff began to sell vehicles without remitting the ad-
vance to CCC. See id. Soon a dispute developed as to whether the dealership was
adequately financed and, ultimately, the credit line was canceled. See id. The
plaintiff accused CCC of improper conduct that ruined plaintiffs business, but did
not extend its accusations to defendant Chrysler. See id. Plaintiff sued CCC for
breach of contract, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and statutory violations of the
Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1221-1225 (1994) (au-
thorizing contract suits by automobile dealers against manufacturers in federal
courts regardless of amount in controversy under Automobile Dealers' Day in
Court Act). Plaintiffs sought both compensatory and punitive damages. See Keys
Jeep Eagle, Inc., 897 F. Supp. at 1441.
The defendant raised the ELR in an effort to bar the fraud claim. See id. at
1443. The court began by stating that the plaintiff admitted the existence of a
contractual relationship with defendant CCC. See id. Analyzing the complaint, the
court said that all of the allegations of fraud arose out of, and were directly related
to, the contract. See id. Also, the plaintiff alleged no personal injury or property
damage in the complaint. See id. Concluding that "[a]ll of the fraud allegations
are wholly dependent on the contractual relationship," the court found that the
ELR barred the fraud claim and entered summary judgment on the claim in favor
of defendant CCC. Id.
The court also granted defendant CCC summary judgment on the breach of
fiduciary duty claim for two reasons. See id. The first was that, under Florida law,
the lender-debtor relationship does not give rise to a fiduciary duty. See id. The
second reason was the ELR. See id. If the fraud claim was barred, so was the claim
for breach of fiduciary duty. See id. As noted earlier, this reasoning may be seri-
ously flawed in light of the Florida Supreme Court's subsequent ruling in HTP that
fraud in the inducement claims are torts that are independent from breach of
contract claims, and therefore, are not barred by the ELR. See HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas
Aereas Costarricenses, 685 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (Fla. 1996).
The court's analysis in KeysJeep Eagle suggests that resort to the ELR, even as
an alternative, was unnecessary and perhaps imprudent. See KeysJeep Eagle, 897 F.
Supp. at 1443. It appears that plaintiff's real problem was that it could not state a
breach of fiduciary duty claim because the lender-debtor relationship generally
does not give rise to a fiduciary relationship and plaintiff did not make any allega-
tions to overcome this general presumption against the creation of a fiduciary rela-
tionship. See id. Hence, it was analytically sound to dismiss the claim on this basis
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Yet another federal district court in Florida addressed the
ELR's application to a fiduciary setting in McCutcheon v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co., Inc.123 The Director of Administration for the Palm
Beach County Sheriff's Office contracted with the defendant, Kid-
der Peabody, to have the defendant purchase securities for the
plaintiff in his official capacity. 124 The plaintiff's complaint con-
tained five counts, including a breach of fiduciary duty claim and a
common law fraud claim. 125 Kidder Peabody argued that the ELR
barred the plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty and fraud claims.
126
The court first addressed the ELR's application to the breach
of fiduciary duty claims. 127 Once again, the court began by looking
to Interstate Securities and restating its holding. 28 It then addressed
the plaintiffs argument that the ELR did not apply because the
plaintiff did not assert a claim for breach of contract and that,
moreover, the contract did not provide a basis for suit because it
did not require Kidder Peabody to manage the plaintiff's
account.129
In contrast to the suggestion of a "no alternative remedy" ex-
ception, as set forth in City of Miami Firefighters, the court in Kidder
Peabody stated: "The case law does not indicate that either a claim
or a basis for a claim of contractual breach must exist in order to
invoke the economic loss rule."' 30 The court opined:
The Florida Supreme Court has made clear that the
failure to bargain for adequate contractual remedies does
alone. See id. Invocation of the ELR may have given comfort to the court, but it
had the unfortunate effect of suggesting that there were no difficulties with apply-
ing the ELR to bar a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. See id.
123. 938 F. Supp. 820 (S.D. Fla. 1996). Once again, the issue of the ELR
presented itself on a motion to dismiss. See id. at 821.
124. See id. In essence, the plaintiff alleged that Kidder Peabody sold plaintiff
inappropriately risky securities even though it knew plaintiff was required, by law,
to invest in safe, liquid investments. See id. Moreover, plaintiff alleged Kidder
Peabody was aware of the speculative nature of the securities it sold, but failed to
disclose the risks to plaintiff. See id. Plaintiff lost large sums of money on these
securities. See id.
125. See id. at 821-22.
126. See id. at 822 (addressing arguments that because plaintiff suffered no
personal injury or property damage, plaintiffs under ELR cannot sustain in-
dependent tort claims to recover economic damages arising out of contractual
relations).
127. See id. at 823 (applying ELR to securities cases).
128. See id. (discussing holding in Interstate Securities that plaintiffs fiduciary
duty claim is dismissed pursuant to ELR because it is based on existence of
contract).
129. See id. (dismissing plaintiffs fiduciary duty claims in Counts I and II).
130. Id.
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not provide a party with an exception to the economic loss
rule.... The [court] has gone so far as to hold that, even
where there is no contractual privity between the parties
to an action in tort, the economic loss rule will bar recov-
ery in tort.131
Following this lead, the court held that the breach of fiduciary duty
claims arose solely by virtue of the contract's existence, and there-
fore, the ELR barred the claims, even in the absence of a specifi-
cally applicable contract provision. 132 Hence, the court dismissed
these claims. 133
Once again, this mechanical application of the ELR fails to
consider the policy ramifications associated with different contexts.
It is true that the parties had a contractual relationship.134 It is also
true that the relationship may have been a fiduciary one. If the
relationship was a fiduciary one, then the societal concerns with the
relationship should be addressed. A conventional way of accom-
plishing this is to permit claims for breach of fiduciary duty and
thereby to authorize tort remedies, such as fully compensatory and
punitive damages.
In this case, the application of the ELR on a motion to dismiss
forecloses the breach of fiduciary duty claims before there is an op-
portunity to explore through discovery the true nature of the rela-
131. Id. By so doing, it appears that the court suggested its holding may have
been the same even in the absence of privity. This is somewhat frightening, for
such a rule would essentially end the viability of breach of fiduciary duty claims in
Florida. The court went on to analogize this case to Interstate Securities. See id. (stat-
ing there was no evidence in that case that contract contemplated account man-
agement by defendant). The court also analogized the case before it to another
Eleventh Circuit opinion. See Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank
N.A., 83 F.3d 1317, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that ELR was bar to negli-
gence claim when court looked, not at whether contract addressed specific con-
duct complained of, but instead at general subject matter), vacated sub nom. Hess
v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 117 S. Ct. 760 (1997); see also Kidder Peabody, 938 F.
Supp. at 824 (stating that Motorcity is indistinguishable from present case).
132. See Kidder Peabody, 938 F. Supp. at 924 ("Plaintiff's claims for breach of
fiduciary duty arise solely as a result of the existence of a contract between the
parties. The fact that ... there is no provision in the contract dealing with defend-
ant's duty to render suitable advice does not shelter plaintiff from . . . the eco-
nomic loss rule.").
133. See id. at 825 (stating that lack of privity does not prevent application of
economic loss rule). The court then turned its attention to Count V, common law
fraud. See id. Once again, the court relied on Interstate Securities to bar the plain-
tiff's fraud claim. See id. at 824-25.
134. See id. at 821.
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tionship.135 Without a chance for the plaintiff to prove the nature
of this relationship, there is no chance for a court to accurately as-
sess whether it is a special relationship justifying heightened reme-
dies for compensatory as well as punitive reasons.
The Kidder Peabody case may ultimately have provided such jus-
tification. A professional investment banking firm was, it seems, en-
trusted with a pension fund for which the firm accepted
responsibility.1 36 These facts suggest a fiduciary duty, but they also
suggest a contract. Often, contractual obligations accompany fidu-
ciary ones. The mere existence of the former does not suggest that
the judicial process should be any less concerned about the latter.
In fact, one would think that the parties' effort to order the nature
of their relationship might cause a court to go the extra mile to
preserve it. Instead, the converse seems to be true. 137
The most recent case applying Florida's ELR to a breach of
fiduciary duty claim is Benedict Feeding Co. v. Priest.'38 This dispute
arose out of a proposed loan transaction between the plaintiff and a
135. See id. at 824-25 (finding plaintiffs argument that lack of contractual pro-
vision dealing with defendant's duty to render truthful and accurate information
and advice unpersuasive).
136. See id. at 821.
137. See id. While the ELR devoured the plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty
claim in Kidder Peabody, such was not the case in Future Tech International, Inc. v. Tae
II Media, Ltd., 944 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1996). Here, the plaintiff, a distributor
of computer equipment, sued several parties for the harm allegedly inflicted on
plaintiffs business in an effort to usurp it. See id. at 1542. On the basis of the ELR,
several defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs claims for fraud in the induce-
ment, tortious interference with business relationships, theft of trade secrets and
breach of fiduciary duty. See id. at 1566.
The court held that the ELR did not bar the fraud in the inducement claim,
the theft of trade secrets claim or the fiduciary duty claim. See id. at 1568 (noting
that first two claims constituted "independent torts" and mere existence of con-
tractual claim between parties cannot act as automatic bar of all tort claims). With
respect to the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court said: "As a general matter,
'[c]ourts have found a fiduciary relation implied in law when confidence is re-
posed by one party and a trust accepted by the other.'" Id. at 1569 (quoting Capi-
tal Bank v. MVB, Inc., 644 So. 2d 515, 518 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)). The court
stated that the ELR did not apply. See id. It used this fact to distinguish Interstate
Securities, which suggested that when the contract is the source of the fiduciary duty
claim, the economic loss rule may apply. See id. The court also believed the ELR
was inapplicable for another reason. See id. Hence, the court also permitted the
breach of fiduciary duty claim to stand. See id.
The court here artfully distinguished Interstate Securities and properly focused
on the relationship of the parties. See id. Believing that the plaintiff might ulti-
mately prove a fiduciary relationship, the court's decision did not punish plaintiff
for the coincidence of a contractual relationship. See id. It did, however, require
independent tortious conduct before permitting the claim to stand. See id. By so
doing, the court apparently recognized that the parties may have allocated the risk
through contracting and that, if they did so, such allocation should stand.
138. No. 96-1836-CIV-T-17, 1997 WL 75605 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 1997).
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third party.' 39 The plaintiff wanted security to insure the return of
the retainer fee, in the event that the loan was not made.1 40 Ac-
cordingly, the plaintiff entered into an escrow agreement with the
three defendants under which two of them would give certain stock
to the third, who would serve as the escrow agent.1 41 When the
loan did not close, the plaintiff did not recover the advance pay-
ment and alleged, among other things, breach of the escrow agree-
ment and breach of fiduciary duty against the escrow agent. 142
After finding that the plaintiff adequately alleged a breach of con-
tract claim, the court then went on to consider the plaintiffs claim
for breach of fiduciary duty.143 The defendant escrow agent as-
serted that the ELR barred the claim, and once again, the court
found itself considering a motion to dismiss predicated in part on
the ELR.144
The court harkened back to Florida Power for the statement that
"'contract principles are more appropriate than tort principles to
resolve purely economic claims."'' 14 5 The court, however, also rec-
ognized the holding of the Florida Supreme Court in HTP, Ltd. v.
Lineas Aereas Costarricenses,146 that "the economic loss rule does not
necessarily bar tort causes of action when the tort alleged is outside
the bounds of the contract in question." 147 Despite this statement
by the Florida Supreme Court, the court in Benedict Feeding barred
the claim and foreclosed plaintiffs recovery of damages for the
139. See id. at *2. As part of this transaction, plaintiff was required to make a
substantial payment in advance that was to be returned to plaintiff in the event the
loan did not close. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. (stating that stock would serve as collateral to guarantee return of
plaintiffs funds if loan did not go through).
142. See id. at *1. ("Defendant... allegedly breached the parties' agreement
... by retaining the stock, and by not delivering the shares of stock to Plaintiff
when it became obvious that the loan would not take place. As a result, Plaintiff
did not recover the . . . retainer fee.").
143. See id. at *3.
144. See id. (stating that plaintiffs "claim is barred by the economic loss rule if
the claim is factually interwoven with plaintiff's breach of contract claim").
145. Id. (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 510
So. 2d 899, 900 (Fla. 1987)). The court went on to state: "Therefore, Florida
courts apply the economic loss rule to prevent tort recovery 'when damages flow
from a breach of contract unless the tort is independent of the breach of con-
tract.' Id. (quoting Brass v. NCR Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1427, 1428 (S.D. Fla. 1993)).
146. 685 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 1996).
147. Benedict Feeding Co., 1997 WL 75605, at *3. Despite this statement, the
court found that the conduct complained of was "interwoven" and not independ-
ent of the contract. See id. (stating that "complaint only allege [d] a breach of fidu-
ciary duty created by the contract" and that there was no "intentional or negligent
act" independent of those allegations).
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breach of fiduciary duty because plaintiffs allegations did not sug-
gest a duty independent of the contract. 148
The court myopically focused on the mechanical application of
the ELR.149 The irony of this court's decision is that the plaintiff
may have actually been hurt by the attempts to protect itself by con-
tract. Without the contract, the court may not have invoked the
ELR and the plaintiff s tort remedies would have been preserved. 150
Although, in light of Casa Clara, the lack of privity may no longer
rescue breach of fiduciary duty claims from the ELR in Florida. 151
Florida's application of the ELR is undesirable in the context
of fiduciary relationships. Analysis of these decisions demonstrates
a general failure to articulate a stable policy basis for the applica-
tion of the ELR in the fiduciary context. This has resulted in much
unresolved confusion as to when and why the ELR should apply. In
148. See id.
149. This prevented the court from seeing the bigger policy picture. Even if
there had been no contract between plaintiff and the escrow agent defendant, the
latter had accepted a fiduciary obligation to the plaintiff. This having happened, it
was irrelevant that the parties sought to memorialize this understanding in a con-
tract. Unless, of course, they had specifically contracted regarding the fiduciary
standard or harm in event of breach.
150. See, e.g., Alfert, supra note 46, at 40 ("In summary, the law surrounding
architects' liability in tort for economic losses suffered by third parties is still some-
what unsettled."); Daniel M. Bachi & Bard D. Rockenbach, The Practical Limitations
of the Economic Loss Rule, 69 FLA. B.J. 89, 92 (1995) ("In cases involving services,
professional or otherwise, the independent tort doctrine remains a viable bound-
ary between contract and tort law."); Bennett, supra note 78, at 46 ("Florida's eco-
nomic loss rule continues to devour commercial torts."); Robert H. Buesing &
John E. Johnson, The Economic Loss Rule: A Trial Lawyer's Guide to Protecting Contract
Rights, 66 FA. B.J. 38, 38 (1992) ("Lawsuits have sometimes been fueled by a party
who, unhappy in hindsight with the negotiated contract, attempts to insert new
terms into the agreement by seeking tort remedies when the contractual remedies
are unfavorable."); Michael A. Hanzman, Interstate Securities Corp. v. Hayes Corp.: An
Unprecedented and Improper Expansion of Florida's "Economic Loss" and "Independent
Tort" Rules, 66 FLA. B.J. 42, 43 (1992) (criticizing Interstate Securities by stating that
its blind reliance "upon the economic loss and independent tort rules ... is inex-
cusable and its ramifications endless"); Schwiep, supra note 17, at 34 ("First, it is
clear that judges, lawyers, and commercial clients alike are all desperately strug-
gling to define the parameters of the economic loss doctrine."); Matthew S. Stef-
fey, Florida's Economic Loss Rule: A Critical Look at the Cases, 64 FLA. B.J. 19, 19 (1990)
("Reasoning that negligence law is really designed to protect against personal in-
jury or property damage, Florida courts often limit those suffering economic loss
alone to whatever contract remedies they may have. Hence the so-called 'eco-
nomic loss rule."'); Wagner & Solomon, supra note 46, at 48 (stating that contract
law is designed to protect private parties, while tort law is designed to protect soci-
ety as a whole from physical harm).
151. Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc.,
620 So. 2d 1244, 1247-48 (Fla. 1993) (applying ELR very broadly to bar tort actions
for economic loss even in absence of privity between claimant and alleged wrong-
doer). For a discussion of Casa Clara, see supra notes 46-64 and accompanying
text.
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any event, the ELR continues to frequently bar breach of fiduciary
duty claims in Florida.
C. The ELR in Illinois
1. General Application of the ELR
Florida is not the only state to have a body of law on the ELR.
Illinois has confronted the issue and has generated its own confu-
sion. The Illinois Supreme Court's first experience with the ELR
was Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. 15 2 Moorman was
a products liability case similar to East River, where the plaintiff
purchased a grain storage tank from the defendant, who designed,
manufactured and sold such tanks.153 A crack developed in the
tank and the plaintiff sued to recover damages for the loss of use of
the tank and its repair.154 The plaintiff's complaint consisted of
four counts, which included strict liability, misrepresentation, negli-
gence and breach of warranty. 155 The trial court dismissed the tort
counts, leaving only the breach of warranty claim. 156
The Illinois Supreme Court began its opinion with a brief re-
view of the law of products liability.157 The court recited the pre-
vailing majority rule, as delineated in Seely, that strict liability denies
recovery for economic loss.158 The court adopted the Seely ration-
ale and stated that this rule "has particular relevance when a per-
152. 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982). For a discussion of Moorman's impact on con-
struction litigation, see Republic National Bank v. Araujo, 697 So. 2d 164 (Ill. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997); Mark C. Friedlander, The Impact of Moorman and Its Progeny on Construc-
tion Litigation, 77 ILL. B.J. 654, 654-56 (1989).
153. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 445.
154. See id.
155. See id. The court stated:
Count I alleged that the tank was not safe due to certain design and
manufacturing defects. Count II asserted that defendant had made cer-
tain representations, which were in fact untrue, in connection with the
sale of the tank. Count III accused defendant of negligently designing
the tank. [In Count IV, plaintiff claimed] it had relied upon an express
warranty made by the defendant at the time of the sale.
Id.
156. See id. ("The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the first
three counts, concluding that the cost of repair and loss of profits or income were
economic losses which could not be recovered under the tort theories named in
the complaint.").
157. See id. (noting that Illinois adopted tort theory of strict liability some
years earlier). At that time, however, the court did not address the question of
whether a consumer could recover under such a theory for strictly economic loss.
See id.
158. See id. at 445-46 (reviewing Seely case and holding that plaintiff who was
uninjured when his truck overturned could not recover economic losses under
strict liability in tort from manufacturer).
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sonal injury results and to some degree when property damage
occurs. It has little relevance to economic loss when neither per-
sonal injury nor property damage is involved." 159
The court also cited the limits of section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts in support of this statement. 160 The court
clearly believed that a warranty claim was superior to a tort claim as
159. Id. at 446-47.
160. See id. at 447 ("[W]e believe the language limiting section 402A ... re-
flects sound policy reasons."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965). For an excellent discussion of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, see Frederick Davis, Product Liability
Under § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the Model Uniform Product Liability
Act, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 513, 545 (1980).
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a mechanism for allocating pure economic loss. 161 Therefore, the
court rejected the strict liability claim.' 62
The concurring opinion agreed with "the general principle
that economic loss should not give rise to product liability in
tort."'163 The concurrence, however, was critical of the majority's
161. See Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 447 (noting that warranty rules function well
in commercial setting, that parties may exclude or modify warranties and that war-
ranty rules effectively limit scope of manufacturer liability). The court stated:
[A]pplication of the rules of warranty prevents a manufacturer from be-
ing held liable for damages of unknown and unlimited scope. If a defend-
ant were held strictly liable in tort for the commercial loss suffered by a
particular purchaser, it would be liable for business losses of other pur-
chasers caused by the failure of the product to meet the specific needs of
their business, even though these needs were communicated only to the
dealer .... Finally, a large purchaser, such as plaintiff in the instant case,
can protect itself against the use of unsatisfactory performance by bar-
gaining for a warranty. Or, it may choose to accept a lower purchase price
for the product in lieu of warranty protection. Subsequent purchasers
may do likewise in bargaining over the price of the product. We believe it
is preferable to relegate the consumer to the comprehensive scheme of
remedies fashioned by the UCC, rather than requiring the consuming
public to pay more for their products so that a manufacturer can insure
against the possibility that some of his products will not meet the business
needs of some of his customers.
Id. at 447-48 (citation omitted). The court also addressed the allegedly arbitrary
nature of the rule by quoting the majority in Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145,
181 (Cal. 1965). See Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 448. The court in Seely stated:
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical
injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does
not rest on the "luck" of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physi-
cal injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the na-
ture of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing
his products. He can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries
caused by defects by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety
defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. He
cannot be held for the level of performance of his products in the con-
sumer's business unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet
the consumer's demands. A consumer should not be charged at the will
of the manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys
a product on the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with the risk
that the product will not match his economic expectations unless the
manufacturer agrees it will. Even in actions for negligence, a manufac-
turer's liability is limited to damages for physical injuries and there is no
recovery for economic loss alone.
Seely, 403 P.2d at 151.
162. See Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 448. The balance of the court's opinion ad-
dressed the theory of "economic loss" and both negligence and misrepresentation
claims. See id. at 449-52 (defining "economic loss" and noting that policy consider-
ations against allowing recovery for solely economic loss in strict liability cases ap-
plies to negligence and innocent misrepresentation claims as well). Rejection of
the latter was based on the court's view that the misrepresentation in the case was
innocent, not negligent or intentional. See id. at 452-53. The court stated that "eco-
nomic loss is recoverable where one intentionally makes false representations." Id.
at 452.
163. Id. at 455 (Simon, J., concurring).
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focus on the character of the harm. 164 The opinion continued with
its astute observations and discussed the need to cease fixating on
the character of the harm.165 Interestingly, the concurrence also
foresaw the difficult choices the ELR required with respect to par-
ties who were not in privity with another.166
The concurrence accurately identified the essential doctrinal
weakness of the ELR-its fixation on the character of the harm as
physical or economic. This fixation leads to the breakdown of the
ELR in any context in which the character of the harm is not a
good proxy for whether a tort duty has.been breached. In products
liability actions, characterization of the harm is a relatively decent
proxy because of the strong and well developed policies that manu-
facturers have a duty to create safe products.1 67 Personal injury or
property damage is some indicator that the manufacturer may have
breached a duty owed to the consumer. Even in such cases, how-
ever, the ultimate focus is broader than the character of the harm
164. See id. at 457 (Simon, J., concurring).
165. See id. at 456 (Simon, J., concurring) ("Physical harm has maintained its
place only because it is a proxy for the real distinction."). The concurrence stated:
The difficulty and disagreements the law has had over the intermediate
case of damage to the product itself reflect the fact that whether recovery
is permitted is unpredictable; there is no quick answer to the question of
whether the loss is economic, and the law has therefore been forced to
take a more comprehensive and more sensible approach than merely
looking for physical distinctions. The fact that physical harm is a proxy
for something else rather than of fundamental legal significance is clearly
seen in the widespread idea that if the incident involves any physical
harm, all losses are recoverable-an idea that the appellate court dis-
cussed and attacked at some length. Such a rule would indeed be out of
place if the law were really concerned about what kinds of items of dam-
ages are recoverable. It makes sense once we realize that the real issue is
whether the incident as a whole belongs in the tort world. The presence
of any physical harm tends to indicate that more is involved than an infer-
ior product; the defect and the hazard were probably such that tort treat-
ment is appropriate. Once we treat the incident as tort, the losses are
recoverable without regard to whether they are physical.
Id. (Simon, J., concurring).
166. See id. (Simon, J., concurring) (stating that "economic loss should be
recoverable out of privity in some circumstances, but not on the same terms as tort
losses"). The concurrence did not believe, however, that economic loss should be
recoverable in tort. See id. (Simon, J., concurring). The concurrence stated:
The proper approach is to develop a system of warranties out of privity to
protect warranty-like, that is contract-like, interests, while using a tort the-
ory to protect tort interests.... [A] tort approach to enforcing routine
commercial expectations is as fictitious as a warranty theory usually is for
personal injuries.
Id. (Simon, J., concurring).
167. For a discussion of the policies underlying the ELR's application in prod-
ucts liability cases, see supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
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and extends to the existence of a duty, and breach and causation
issues.
As one moves out of the products liability context into other
commercial torts, the breakdown in the rule becomes apparent.
The law designs many commercial torts, namely breach of fiduciary
duty, to recompense economic loss. 168 It may be relatively infre-
quent that one suffers personal injury or property damage at the
hands of such a tortfeasor. Hence, the proxy is no longer reliable,
and mechanical application of the ELR can lead courts astray. The
only salvation is to look at the public policies underlying the alleged
tort and ascertain whether the breach violated these policies. The
concurrence in Moorman wisely recognized this point.169 With this
backdrop in place, this Article examines and critiques Illinois's ex-
perience with the ELR and breach of fiduciary duty claims.
2. The ELR and Breach of Fiduciay Duty Claims in Illinois
Several years after the Illinois Supreme Court decided Moor-
man, a federal district court in Illinois addressed the application of
the ELR to a breach of fiduciary duty claim in St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. v. Great Lakes Turnings, Ltd.170 Great Lakes was in the
business of collecting, selling and shipping a volatile product.171
After Great Lakes obtained insurance, a fire destroyed a shipment
of the product. 72 Great Lakes notified its insurance broker about
the fire and the insurance broker told Great Lakes that it would
notify the two insurers.173 The defendant, however, only notified
one of the insurers, and the insurer who never received notice con-
tested coverage on that basis.1 74
The defendant moved to dismiss based in part on the ELR. 175
With respect to the ELR, the court said only that it barred the re-
168. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 707, 714 (Del. 1983) (concluding
equitable and monetary relief appropriate to remedy breach of fiduciary duty).
169. Moorman, 435 N.E.2d at 456 (Simon, J., concurring). For a discussion of
Moorman, see supra notes 152-69 and accompanying text.
170. 774 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
171. See id. at 486. In order to get insurance for its business, plaintiff turned
to an insurance broker, for assistance and advice with respect to what types of
insurance were necessary. See id. at 486-87.
172. See id. at 487.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 487-88, 490. The court gave this argument very little attention,
only a short paragraph at the end of the opinion. See id. at 490 (stating that fiduci-
ary duty claims are not barred because Great Lakes' claims "are based on contract
and agency theories," not negligence). The defendant claimed unsuccessfully that
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covery of economic loss in negligence cases. 176 The court stated
that the claims in the case were based not on negligence, but on
contract and agency theories. 177 Hence, without plumbing the pol-
icy considerations underlying the rule or different contexts, the
court found the ELR did not apply and denied the motion to
dismiss. 178
Fiduciary duties arise in contractual and agency settings. That
fact, however, does not satisfactorily resolve the issue of whether to
apply the ELR in a fiduciary context. In the products liability con-
text, the existence of warranty or contractual liability is important
because it is these two areas through which the consumer is able to
protect himself or herself against economic loss. The court, how-
ever, does not explain the significance of contract, or lack thereof,
in the fiduciary context. If the parties come to stand in a fiduciary
relationship vis-t-vis one another as the court believes, then supple-
menting contractual remedies with a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty is logical. This process reinforces the relationship and fills the
gaps in contracts with reasonable societal expectations. 179
The Illinois federal courts again revisited this issue in Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Miller.180 There, the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) sued former officers and directors of a
failed bank for fraud, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and
breach of contract. 81 The defendants, relying on the ELR and
Moorman, moved to dismiss the tort claims.1 82
bad faith was an element of a breach of fiduciary duty claim. See id. at 489 (noting
instead that good faith is available defense).
176. See id. at 490 (stating that Moorman doctrine is inapplicable because
claims in question utilize contract and agency theories).
177. See id.
178. See id. ("The Moorman doctrine does not apply.").
179. The mere statement that this is not a negligence claim and that, ergo,
the ELR does not apply is of little help to prospective litigants andjudges. It does
not explain the policies weighed and the ultimate balance. Because of this point,
the ELR becomes unpredictable. This is an especially horrible thing where the
judicial expectation, in any given context, may be that one should have protected
themselves by contracting. If one cannot ascertain what those situations are, it is
hard to efficiently protect oneself. Moreover, one should not have to guess what
the law is and compensate for its lack of clarity with disproportionate amounts of
protection and endless contracting for every possible contingency. This inefficient
use of resources serves no one.
180. 781 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
181. See id. at 1273.
182. See id. at 1276 ("The defendants contest the availability of a... cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence based on... Moorman."). The
opinion granted the motion to dismiss the federal claim that was based on the
Financial Institutions Reform Recovery & Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 12
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The court refused to accept that Moorman stood for the over-
simplistic statement that tort prohibits recovery of economic loss. 183
The court stated: "Defendants owed their duty of care to [the
bank] not solely as a result of any agreement into which they have
entered, but rather by virtue of the position they held with [the
bank] .-184 Hence, the counts for fraud, negligence and breach of
fiduciary duty stood. 18 5
This case at least fits a conventional view that a suit against of-
ficers and directors of a corporation is often a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty with a standard of care that may sound in negligence
or gross negligence.1 6 It would certainly be strange to bar such
claims. Once again, however, the court does not enlighten us as to
the policy reasons behind abandoning the ELR in this context.
Likewise, it does not explain the relationship between the breach of
fiduciary duty claim and the employment contracts of these officers
and directors, or more specifically, the effect, if any, of the latter on
the former.
It is conceivable that the corporation might protect itself
against breaches of its fiduciary obligations in a contract. What
good, however, does applying the ELR serve in the light of the
strong common law tradition supporting a claim in such a context?
Moreover, the possibility of foreseeable compensatory damages and
punitive damages is consistent with the fiduciary view of the rela-
tionship. Hence, as with the previous case, the result of this case
may be correct, but the reasoning is not helpful.
The same court once again looked at Moorman and breach of
fiduciary duty claims in Scholes v. Stone, McGuire & Benjamin.18 7 The
receiver for a failed partnership and its investors sued two law firms
and individual members of those law firms for violations of the fed-
eral securities laws, legal malpractice, negligence, fraud and breach
of fiduciary duty.188 One set of defendants argued that the applica-
U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994). See Miller, 781 F. Supp. at 1276 (stating that no claim was
stated absent allegation of "gross negligence").
183. See Miller, 781 F. Supp. at 1277 (stating that Moorman forces claims
grounded solely on breach of contract to be brought in contract, not tort).
184. Id.
185. See id. On a motion for reconsideration, the Miller court affirmed its
denial of the motion to dismiss. See id. at 1279 ("IT] he Moorman doctrine does not
bar the claims.").
186. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963)
(ruling that standard of care is ordinary negligence). But see Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (defining standard of care as gross negligence).
187. 786 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
188. See id. at 1387-88. The case came before the court on its review of the
magistrate's report on the defendants' motion to dismiss. See id. at 1388. The
[Vol. 42: p. 789826
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tion of Moorman to the "legal malpractice-negligence" claims re-
quired their dismissal.Y39 The court, however, was not sympathetic
to this argument. 190 In rejecting the argument, the court stated
that "a different result may be reached where there is fraud present
or where extracontractual, fiduciary or ethical duties are at issue,
despite the fact that the damages sought to be recovered are really
for economic loss."191 The court applied this exception to the pres-
ent case. 192 The court also noted that tort principles were superior
to contract principles in the case before it.193 Hence, the court per-
mitted this claim to stand and did not dismiss the breach of fiduci-
ary duty claim. 194
Perhaps this, too, was the right result. A look at the complaint
revealed that the plaintiff stood in a fiduciary relationship with the
defendant.195 It may also have revealed that the parties could not
adequately protect themselves through contracting. This may be
especially true when the process is infected by fraud. 196
In Collins v. Reynard, 197 the Illinois Supreme Court squarely ad-
dressed whether Moorman barred legal malpractice claims sounding
underlying facts involved a series of complicated and allegedly fraudulent transac-
tions assisted by the defendants. See id. at 1389-92.
189. See id. at 1396-97.
190. See id. at 1397-98.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 1398.
193. See id. (stating that because fraud is alleged, unforeseen liability princi-
ples do not apply). The court stated:
The Moorman Doctrine was created to alleviate the assumed unfair-
ness in exposing professionals to unlimited and unforeseen liability for
economic loss to injured parties. It was thought that contract damages
were a superior remedy because they do not expose defendants to ...
unfair liability. Where fraud is alleged, as here, these principles do not
apply. Any damages owed would not come as a surprise because defend-
ants had knowledge of its wrongful acts.
Id. (citations omitted).
194. See id. (finding that adequate allegations were made to support claim).
The court did not discuss Moorman in connection with the breach of fiduciary duty
claim. Instead, like in Miller, it simply stated its belief that adequate allegations
were made. See id. (stating that if plaintiff proves alleged facts, attorney-client rela-
tionship will be established).
195. See id. (stating that attorney-client relationship gives rise to fiduciary
duty).
196. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Platt, No. 92-CV-277-WDS, 1992 WL
672942, at *13 (S.D. 11. Oct. 23, 1992). Simply stating that adequate allegations
were made with respect to the breach of fiduciary duty claim again, however, does
not explain the role of the ELR. If one assumes that it is because the ELR has no
application to breach of fiduciary duty claims because of the very different policies
at play, it would be instructive to have the court's rationale as a guide or, at least, a
simple declarative statement that such was true.
197. 607 N.E.2d 1185 (Ill. 1992).
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in tort, as opposed to contract.198 In Collins, the plaintiff brought a
professional malpractice suit against her lawyer. 199 The complaint
stated both contract and tort claims.20 0
At the trial court level, the court refused to dismiss the tort
claim. 20 ' In considering the appellate court's ruling reversing the
trial court, the court again focused on Moorman.20 2 The court re-
marked on Moorman and admitted that "[a] different analysis might
have started at the beginning with a first consideration given to the
relationship between the parties under a traditional contract or tort
analysis. '20 3 Having said this, the court went on to contrast the na-
ture of contract law with tort law.20 4 All of this suggested that the
appellate court's analysis was correct. The court, however, then il-
logically asserted that the tradition of tort in legal malpractice had
to win out nonetheless. 20 5 To do otherwise, would invite chaos and
dysfunction.2 0 6
198. See id. at 1186 (holding that "a complaint against a lawyer for profes-
sional malpractice may be couched in either contract or tort.").
199. See id. ("The gist of the complaint is that the lawyer, in drafting certain
sales documents for the client, failed to protect the client's security interest in the
property being sold, thus causing a financial loss to the client.").
200. See id.
201. See id. The appellate court reversed this result. See id. at 1185-86. Ini-
tially, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, but on reargument
reversed. See id. at 1186.
202. See id. ("Moorman attempted to distinguish between recovery in tort and
recovery in contract by looking at the nature of the damage suffered rather than to
the relationship between the parties or to the act which caused the damage.").
203. Id.
204. See id. at 1186-87 (noting different context in which both contract and
tort law are applicable). The court stated:
Contract law applies to voluntary obligations freely entered into be-
tween parties. Damages recoverable under a breach of contract theory
are based upon the mutual expectation of the parties. The basic princi-
ple for the measurement of contract damages is that the injured party is
entitled to recover an amount that will put him in as good a position as
he would have been had the contract been performed as agreed. Tort
law, on the other hand, applies in situations where society recognizes a
duty to exist wholly apart from any contractual undertaking. Tort obliga-
tions are general obligations that impose liability when a person negli-
gently, carelessly, or purposely causes injury to others.
Id. at 1186.
205. See id. The court stated:
The appellate court, in attempting to extend the rationale of the
Moorman doctrine to the case at hand, ruled contrary to the ruling we
announce today. While we do not fault its logic we do not follow its rul-
ing. Rather, we adhere to long established practice and custom. Logic
may be a face card but custom is a trump.
Id.
206. See id. at 1187 (explaining that ruling is limited "to the specific field of
lawyer malpractice as an exception to the so-called Moorman doctrine and to the
distinctions separating contract and tort"). Eschewing logic for precedent, it ap-
[Vol. 42: p. 789
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The concurrence in Collins took issue with the majority's re-
marks concerning custom and logic. 20 7 The concurrence stated
that the proper focus was on the relevant policy considerations, not
on the character of the harm.208 The concurrence hinted that the
fiduciary nature of the relationship is a central policy reason for the
exception, but it did not suggest that the exception should extend
beyond the attorney-client relationship. 20 9
In Illinois Constructors Corp. v. Morency & Associates, Inc.,210 an
Illinois federal district court was again confronted with a defend-
ant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for breach of contract,
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.21 1 The facts of this case
were similar to St. Paul Fire & Marine.2 12 The defendant was an
pears the Collins court believed that it was necessary to restore some order to the
ELR. It may not, however, have gone far enough with its exception. By carefully
limiting it to the legal malpractice context, it ignored other fiduciary relationships.
207. Id. (Miller, C.J., concurring) ("I believe that today's result is dictated not
only by custom but by logic as well. The development of the Moorman doctrine
and the nature of the attorney-client relationship makes clear that the doctrine can
have no application here.").
208. See id. at 1189 (Miller, C.J., concurring) ("It is difficult to apply [Moor-
man] in the area of legal representation where the purpose of retaining counsel is
to obtain a representative who will function as a fiduciary and will act profession-
ally with reasonable skill and ability, to advance the client's interests.").
209. See id. at 1188 (Miller, C.J., concurring) (stating that court has developed
Moorman doctrine by focusing on policies served by rule). Other fiduciary relation-
ships, however, are certainly as worthy of protection. With respect to fiduciary
obligation, the law concerns itself with those unable to adequately protect them-
selves through the bargaining process. See id. at 1189 (Miller, C.J., concurring)
("The cases in which Moorman applie [s] are grounded on the notion that the com-
plaining party, if he wished protection against the particular type of harm suffered,
could have bargained for a guarantee .... It would be rare ... for an attorney to
guarantee... to achieve a particular result in a matter."); see also Inter-Asset Finanz
AG v. Refco, Inc., No. CIV.A.92 C 7833, 1993 WL 222710, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 21,
1993) ("There is no indication that a service relationship involving fiduciary and
agency duties would come under the Moorman doctrine."); Brandt v. Jack Levy
Assocs., Inc., No. CIV.A.92 C 5075, 1993 WL 95383, at *34 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 1993)
(refusing to apply Moorman as bar to economic damages pursuant to breach of
duty of care claim when breach of fiduciary duty claim was also upheld); Forsythe
v. Polsky, No. CIV.A.90 C 7302, 1993 WL 69600, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 1993)
(holding that to extent negligence claim was premised on breach of fiduciary duty
claim, said claim was not barred by ELR set forth in Moorman); Mid Continent
Cabinetry, Inc. v. George Kock Sons, Inc., No. CIV.A.87-1248-C, 1991 WL 177961,
at *6 (D. Kan. Aug. 9, 1991) ("[W]e have no hesitancy in concluding ... that...
an action seeking damages for economic loss to a savings and loan institution re-
sulting from breach of fiduciary duty by its officers is beyond the purview of [a
statute that might otherwise preclude recovery for pure economic loss]."). While
this may certainly be true in the attorney-client context, it is as true in other fiduci-
ary relationships.
210. 802 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
211. Id. at 187.
212. See id. For a discussion of the facts of St. Paul Fire & Marine, see supra
notes 170-79 and accompanying text.
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insurance broker hired by the plaintiff to obtain insurance for the
plaintiff's business. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's serv-
ices were inadequate in this regard and left it without coverage for
some substantial claims. 213
With respect to the breach of contract and fiduciary duty
claims, the court cited St. Paul Fire & Marine for the proposition
that Moorman distinguished between tort actions and those brought
under contract or agency principles. 214 In allowing the claims to
stand, the court did not expound on this statement. Hence, this
court did not advance the understanding of the relationship be-
tween the policies underlying Moorman and those underlying claims
for fiduciary duty.2 15
In yet another effort to clarify the issue, the Illinois Supreme
Court spoke again concerning the ELR in Congregation of the Passion,
Holy Cross Provence v. Touche Ross & Co.2 16 The plaintiff, a church,
hired the defendant, an accounting firm, to prepare for its use an
unaudited financial statement regarding the most recently com-
213. See Illinois Constructors, 802 F. Supp. at 187. The insurance contract that
plaintiff negotiated failed to provide for pollution coverage. See id. Shortly after-
wards, defendant's tugboat sank in the Mississippi River spilling diesel fuel. See id.
As a result, defendant had no coverage for claims arising out of the spill or indem-
nification for money expended on the clean up. See id.
214. See id. at 188 ("The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in [Moorman] bars
recovery of purely economic loss in most tort actions in Illinois. Nonetheless,
(plaintiffs] claims ... are based on contract and agency theories and thus Moor-
man is inapplicable.").
215. See id. at 188 (recognizing "Illinois's reluctance to create exceptions to
the Moorman doctrine's ban on recover of economic loss in circumstances
analagous to those of the present"). In light of Moorman, however, the negligence
count was troubling to the court. The court reviewed the Illinois case law barring
the recovery of economic loss in negligence cases. See id. at 188-89. Nevertheless,
the court thought that "Illinois law supports recovery against an insurance broker
on a theory of negligence." Id. The court noted that the relationship between an
insurance broker and its principal gives rise to extracontractual duties. See id. (stat-
ing that defendant served as plaintiffs insurance broker for seven or eight years
and was allegedly granted significant responsibility). Thus, none of the claims
were barred, and because they were all adequately pled by the plaintiff, they were
allowed to stand. See id. at 189-90.
Permitting the negligence claim to stand in the face of Moorman and Collins is
problematic because the plaintiff sought recovery of pure economic loss. In a
sense, the negligence claim could be viewed as inappropriate because the contract
supplemented by the breach of fiduciary claim would preserve the expectations of
the parties and reinforce the fiduciary relationship. Moreover, the negligence
claim would seemingly mirror the contract claim or the breach of fiduciary duty
claim. This thought is generated by the court's own language in describing the
negligence claim. In speaking about it, the court emphasized the long nature of
the relationship and the trust between the plaintiff and the defendant. See id. at
189. These words more accurately describe a breach of fiduciary claim. The claim
inexplicably stood. Once again, it seems tradition prevailed and rightly so.
216. 636 N.E.2d 503 (Ill. 1994).
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pleted fiscal year.217 The defendant decided to record these invest-
ments at cost, and as a result, these records did not reflect
subsequent market fluctuations.21 8 When the plaintiff realized that
the financial statements misstated the value of the accounts, the
plaintiff sued the defendant on the theories of negligence, breach
of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. 219 The trial court awarded
damages on the negligence claim to the plaintiff, but failed to
award anything on the contract claim.220
The supreme court traced the development of the ELR both
generally and in Illinois.221 The court summarized this law:
The evolution of the economic loss doctrine shows
that the doctrine is applicable to the service industry only
where the duty of the party performing the service is de-
fined by the contract that he executes with his client.
Where a duty arises outside of the contract, the economic
loss doctrine does not prohibit recovery in tort for the
negligent breach of that duty. The present case involves
professional malpractice by an accounting firm. The un-
derlying issue is whether the duty an accountant owes to
his client is defined by his contractual obligations, or is
extracontractual. 222
217. See id. at 505. During the same time, the plaintiff hired an investment
advisor who engaged in an arbitrage trading strategy on plaintiff's behalf. See id.
218. See id. at 506. Plaintiff claimed that, in deciding to record the invest-
ments at cost, it was deferring to the expertise of defendant because plaintiff did
not understand the investments. See id. Defendant, however, claimed that the
plaintiff did understand the investment and that the decision to record them at
cost was mutual. See id.
219. See id. at 508. Prior to trial, the defendant unsuccessfully argued that
Moorman barred the negligence claim. See id. Defendant subsequently moved for a
directed verdict on all counts and the court granted the motion with respect to the
breach of fiduciary duty claim only. See id. at 509.
220. See id. One of the points raised by the defendant on appeal was the ap-
plication of Moorman. See id. ("Defendant... claims that the lower court judg-
ment awarding damages for purely economic losses in tort is contrary to Moorman
.). In considering the negligence count, the court defined the issue as
"whether the economic loss doctrine bars recovery in tort for accountant malprac-
tice." Id. at 512.
221. See id. at 512-14 (reviewing prior application of economic loss doctrine).
The court summarized Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1185 (Ill. 1992), and com-
pared the attorney-client relationship with the accountant-client relationship. See
Congregation of the Passion, 636 N.E.2d at 514-15 ("An analogy to the accountant-
client relationship can be found in the attorney-client relationship.").
222. See Congregation of the Passion, 636 N.E.2d at 514.
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The court decided the duties were extracontractual, did not apply
the ELR, and therefore, held the claim was proper.223
The dissent, however, called the majority's opinion "incoher-
ent" regarding its discussion of the Moorman doctrine. 224 The dis-
sent stated: "Rather than clearly defining the relationship between
professional malpractice and Moorman, the majority opinion puts
litigants and trial judges in a position of having to guess what the
exception of the month is. Yesterday it was attorneys. Today, it's
accountants but not architects. Tomorrow, who can say?" 225 The
dissent continued to rail: "What are these extracontractual duties?
If these duties cannot be articulated in a contract, how is it that the
client is able to articulate that they have been breached in a com-
plaint?" 226 In conclusion, the dissent stated that courts should con-
fine the application of the economic loss doctrine to cases involving
products liability.2
27
The court's consistent failure to ground Moorman in public pol-
icy makes its application an act of judicial whimsy. Not only do the
dissent's remarks apply to the malpractice context, but they also
223. See id. at 515 (stating that because accountant's duty exists independently
of contract, economic loss doctrine does not bar recovery in tort); see also Rohlfing
v. Manor Care, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 330, 351 (E.D. Ill. 1997) ("Defendant's argument
ignores an important limitation on the scope of the economic loss doctrine: 'The
economic loss doctrine does not bar recovery in tort for breach of a duty that exists
independently of a contract."'). In the concurrence, Judge Freeman expressed
not only his agreement with the result, but also his concern with the majority's
handling of prior case law. See Congregation of the Passion, 636 N.E.2d at 519-20
(Freeman, J., concurring) ("I agree with the result .... The majority apparently
recognized that the extracontractual analysis creates an unnatural tension between
this case and Lincoln Park .... In my view, Lincoln Park is irreconcilable with this
case, and . .. should be overruled.").
224. See Congregation of the Passion, 636 N.E.2d at 520 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 525 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 526 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 528 (Heiple, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
If one agrees that damages in professional malpractice cases are fore-
seeable, what theory a plaintiff brings a suit under becomes irrelevant.
The extent of damages should be the same in tort or contract .... One
must also keep in mind that a suit in tort does not mean that a plaintiff
suing for purely economic or commercial loss has automatically won.
The plaintiff still has to establish the elements of a tort. That is, the bur-
den of proving duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages remains a
prerequisite to recovery.
Id. at 527 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
The dissent's characterization of the opinion as incoherent was strong, but
not inappropriately so. Illustrated again is the doctrine's weakness outside the
products liability context. The cases never answer the question as to why account-
ants, architects or attorneys should be treated the same or differently with respect
to the ELR. They never analyze, except in the most cursory fashion, the underly-
ing relationships and society's concerns with them.
832 [Vol. 42: p. 789
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apply to any context in which fiduciary duties develop. Telling a
prospective litigant that the line is at the point where duties cease
being "contractual" is not helpful. In fact, it is circular logic be-
cause what is contractual or extracontractual is, in considerable
part, a function of what the parties do at the outset of the relation-
ship, and this is, in turn, a function of what they believe the law
protects in the absence of a contractual understanding. In sum,
there are no guidelines, policy or otherwise, as to when the ELR will
apply.228
Thereafter, an Illinois federal district court held that Moorman
barred a claim for facilitating a breach of trust in Ohio Casualty In-
surance Co. v. Bank One.229 In Ohio Casualty, an insurance company
sued a bank for various claims including one for facilitating a
228. See, e.g., Continental Leavitt Communications, Ltd. v. Painewebber, Inc.,
857 F. Supp. 1266 (N.D. Ill. 1994). In this case, the plaintiff, a distributor of elec-
tronic products wholesale, sued the defendant stockbroker for negligent misrepre-
sentation, promissory estoppel and breach of fiduciary duty. See id. at 1268-69.
The dispute arose out of the plaintiffs attempt to secure a line of credit to a cus-
tomer. See id. at 1268.
The customer offered bearer bonds as security and the plaintiff went to the
defendant to verify their authenticity. See id. at 1268-69. In the event of customer's
default, the plaintiff planned to redeem the bonds for cash. See id. The defendant
indicated to the plaintiff that the bonds were authentic and that the defendant
would dispose of the bonds in the event that the need arose. See id. The customer
did default, but before the plaintiff could cash the bonds, they were seized by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as stolen goods. See id. at 1269.
The case was before the court on defendant's summary judgment motion as to
all counts. See id. It was only with respect to the negligent misrepresentation count
that the court even mentioned Moorman. See id. at 1270 (stating that negligent
misrepresentation is exception to ELR). The court stated that "economic loss may
be recovered for torts such as intentionally false representations ... and for...
negligent misrepresentation." Id. This discussion did not explain the policy ra-
tionale for distinguishing these cases other than to cite to the restatement as au-
thorizing such suits. See id. Hence, the balance of the court's analysis did not
concern itself with Moorman or the effects of the ELR. The court relied on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552, which states in pertitent part:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment,
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies
false information for the guidance of others in their business transac-
tions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justi-
fiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable
care or competence in obtaining or communicating information.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
With respect to the fiduciary duty claim, the court lucidly based its grant of
summary judgment on the fact that, although alleged, no fiduciary relationship
existed between the plaintiff and defendant. See Painewebber, 857 F. Supp. at 1275
(stating that domination, influence and superiority were necessary elements of
such relationship and mere reliance one places in expert's advice is insufficient).
The conclusion aside, this analysis is more cogent than introducing the ELR as an
eradicator of all breach of fiduciary duty claims when a contractual relationship
has been alleged.
229. No. 95 C 6613, 1996 WL 507292, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Sept 5, 1996).
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breach of trust.230 The dispute arose after claims against the insur-
ance company were made on fidelity bonds issued by the company
for losses caused by a public official's embezzlement.2 31 The insur-
ance company alleged that the bank's participation in this official's
check kiting scheme contributed to the losses. 232 After dismissing a
breach of contract claim with leave to amend, the court turned its
attention to the negligence count.23 3 The court rejected the argu-
ment that the case before it fell within the exception articulated in
Congregation of the Passion.234 Hence, it barred the negligence claim
and, subsequently, the claim for facilitating breach of trust.235
As there may be little reason to distinguish facilitating breaches
of trust from the breach itself, it appears that if breach of fiduciary
duty claims in Illinois contain any allegations of negligence, they
may be subject to dismissal under Moorman and the ELR. They are
certainly threatened, and therefore, practitioners seeking to assert
breach of fiduciary duty claims in Illinois must be aware of this po-
tential pitfall and draft their complaints accordingly. This result is
a natural, but unfortunate, consequence of the mechanical applica-
tion of the ELR. Such an approach fails to recognize the signifi-
cance of a fiduciary relationship and the deleterious effect that
barring fiduciary duty claims may have on the conduct of
fiduciaries.
230. Id. at *1.
231. See id.
232. See id. at *1-2. Plaintiff alleged that the public official who was in charge
of a township's money embezzled township funds through a secret account at the
bank, which was hidden from township auditors. See id. at *1. It alleged that the
bank permitted him to open this secret township account, even though he had no
authority to do so. See id.
233. See id. at *8 (stating that "Moorman doctrine" is applicable in negligence
cases).
234. See id. at *9. The court stated:
We . . . do not believe this case falls within the scope of the court's
holding in Congregation of the Passion. That case focused on the traditional
duties of competence that exist outside of any contract that a lawyer or
accountant owes to his client. We do not believe that a bank, an institu-
tion dealing with its clients through multiple employees, has these same
traditional responsibilities.
Id. at *10.
235. See id. The court came to this result by first stating that this claim's title is
misleading. See id. (stating that facilitating breach of trust claim is basically negli-
gence amounting to bad faith). With this view in place, the court held that Moor-
man barred such a claim because it sought to recover only economic loss. See id.
(stating that no exception is compatible to case at hand). This was so even though
the court recognized the cause of action and believed it was otherwise adequately
pled. See id. (noting permissibility of negligence amounting to bad faith claim).
[Vol. 42: p. 789
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D. New York's Bout with the ELR in a Fiduciary Context
Several years before Ohio Casualty, a New York court engaged
in a similar struggle. In Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Stone & Web-
ster Engineering Corp.,2 36 several utilities brought suit against the de-
fendant, an engineering firm, for the negligent design and
construction of a nuclear facility.23 7 The plaintiff asserted claims in
both contract and tort.2 38
236. 725 F. Supp. 656 (N.D.N.Y. 1989).
237. Id. at 657 (stating that central issue is whether, and to what extent, in-
dependent cause of action in tort exists under New York law for negligent or
grossly negligent performance of contractual services).
238. See id. The defendant initially moved to dismiss. See id. In considering
the motion to dismiss, the court framed the issue as "determining the circum-
stances under which 'a party to a contract may be held liable in tort to another
party thereto as a result of some clash in the contractual relationship.'" Id. at 659
(quoting Apple Records, Inc. v. Capital Records, Inc., 529 N.Y.S.2d 279, 281 (App.
Div. 1988). The court first considered whether, in fact, there existed a cause of
action for the negligent performance of a contract. See id. at 6611 ("[T]his court
does not find ... that there is always a tort cause of action for negligent perform-
ance of contractual services.").
The court said, however, that "the existence of a contract does not necessarily
bar a tort claim." Id. The general rule, said the court, was that "the breach of a
contract is not actionable in tort in the absence of special additional allegations of
wrongdoing which amount to 'a breach of duty distinct from, or in addition to, the
breach of a contract.'" Id. at 662 (quoting North Shore Bottling Co. v. Schmidt &
Sons, Inc. 292 N.Y.S.2d 86, 92 (App. Div. 1968)). In reviewing the allegations in
the complaint, the court commented that the negligence claims "read as . . .an
'afterthought' to the allegations of breach of contract." Id. at 663. To the extent
they were merely this, the claims were dismissed. See id. at 666 (repeating that New
York does not always recognize tort for negligent performance of contractual
services).
Alternatively, plaintiffs asserted that there arose between the plaintiffs and de-
fendant, a relationship of trust and confidence that gave rise to an independent
tort duty. See id. at 667. In analyzing this, the court stated that the focus should be
on whether a noncontractual duty, a duty imposed as a matter of social policy, was
violated. See id. (outlining when societally imposed duty of care can arise). In the
present case, the court pointed out that there was an extended relationship and
huge sums of money at stake. See id. at 668. Moreover, there were important safety
and regulatory concerns. See id. Given this, the court declined to dismiss the ac-
tion. See id. (stating that status of case makes determination of whether plaintiff
will vrove relationship of trust and confidence impossible).
This court was sensitive to the fact that the prudent course was between the
extremes of creating and destroying a tort action every time a contractual relation-
ship was created. The court also knew that the answer lay in ascertaining the rele-
vant public policies. Furthermore, the court realized that any such judgment on
the issue was premature. The plaintiff, as did the court, needed the benefit of
discovery to ascertain whether the facts justified permitting a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty. In light of this, the ensuing decision on summary judgment is all
the more bewildering.
The ITT defendant, subsequently, moved for summary judgment on the tort
claims, which included negligence, gross negligence and breach of contract. See
id. at 659. In connection with the summary judgment motion, the court addressed
the interplay of the existence of a special relationship and the ELR with respect to
plaintiffs negligence claims. See id. at *24 (holding that economic loss doctrine
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The court first considered whether there was a special relation-
ship between the parties so as to give rise to an independent legal
duty of care. 2 39 With respect to the application of the ELR, the
plaintiff argued that such was "inapplicable where a special relation-
ship of trust and confidence has been shown." 24° Despite its will-
ingness to concede the possibility of a special relationship, the
court refused to accept plaintiffs argument. 241 The reason for this
refusal was not entirely clear. The court stressed that the plaintiffs
claim sounded in negligence, not in an intentional tort or breach
of fiduciary duty.2 4 2 If the plaintiff predicated the claim on the spe-
cial relationship and the involved conduct rose to the level of an
intentional tort, then it seems the claim would have survived. 243
bars plaintiff's negligence claims without holding that relationship of trust and
confidence guarantees recovery of economic loss damages in tort).
239. See id. at 661. The court looked at two possible sources for such a rela-
tionship. See id. First, whether such a relationship grew out of the trust and confi-
dence reposed in the defendant by the plaintiff, and second, whether the
relationship arose by virtue of defendant's role as project manager. See id. (stating
differentiation is necessary because parties did not analyze each possibility sepa-
rately). The court found the evidence on the first point to be conflicting, and for
that reason it decided any resolution was in the province of thejury. See id. (noting
conflicting nature of evidence). While the court was doubtful as to the second
point, it nonetheless refused to grant summary judgment with respect to it. See id.
at 662 (finding procedural flaws in defendant's offer of proof in support of sum-
mary judgment motion).
240. Id. (noting that plaintiff narrowed focus of argument).
241. See id. (refusing to hold that economic loss damages are recoverable in
tort when there is finding of special relationship of trust and confidence).
242. See id. at 664 (noting that plaintiff freely admitted intentional torts were
absent from this case).
243. See id. at 665 (stating that for plaintiff to prevail on gross negligence tort
cause of action, which is analogous to intentional tort, plaintiff must establish exist-
ence of special relationship with defendant). In another New York case, the plain-
tiff research centers sued the defendant, a provider of various administrative
services, for breach of contract, negligence, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary
duty, malpractice, concealment and negligent and intentional misrepresentation.
See Asian Vegetable Research & Dev. Ctr. v. Institute Of Int'l Educ., 944 F. Supp.
1169, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The plaintiffs asserted that the defendant misman-
aged the retirement plans it was charged with administering. See id. at 1173.
The court began its analysis by looking at the existing contracts between the
plaintiff and defendant. See id. at 1171-73. Among the provisions was one that
appeared in some, but not all, of the contracts and stated: "Nothing... shall cause
[the defendant] to be a fiduciary with respect to... [the] retirement plans." Id. at
1172. Not only did the court believe this language unambiguously expressed the
intent of the parties that they would not stand in such a relationship, but it also
believed that the nature of the parties' relationship did not otherwise support the
existence of a fiduciary obligation. See id. at 1179 (noting that relationship was
simply one between a service provider and its client).
The court also granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment with
respect to malpractice, negligence and gross negligence claims. See id. at 1180.
With respect to the malpractice claim, the court declined to expand the tort be-
cause it did not consider the defendant to be engaged in the practice of a profes-
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The court, however, left an important question unanswered or,
if answered, muddled. It was not clear from the court's opinion
whether plaintiffs claims would have been saved by recasting them
in terms of claims for breach of fiduciary duty, even if the breach
was not intentional. In other words, the opinion did not resolve
whether the ELR would bar, irrespective of the nature of the rela-
tionship, all claims alleging negligence in any sense. This is impor-
tant because many breaches of fiduciary duty may be something less
than intentional. The confusion here is similar to that with respect
to Collins and Ohio Casualty.
E. New Jersey's Experience with the ELR in a Fiduciary Setting
Courts in NewJersey have also applied some variant of the ELR
to breach of fiduciary duty claims. In International Minerals & Min-
ing Corp. v. Citicorp North America, Inc.,244 the plaintiff sued the de-
fendant, a bank, alleging that the bank improperly denied it a
sion. See id. at 1179-80 (setting forth test for determining whether service
constitutes profession and finding that defendant did not meet test). With respect
to the claims of negligence and gross negligence, the court stated that, in New
York, "'a simple breach of contract is not to be considered a tort unless a legal duty
independent of the contract itself has been violated.'" Id. at 1180 (quoting Clark-
Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 656 (App. Ct. 1987)).
The court also identified three guideposts for separating tort claims from con-
tract claims: (1) whether a legal duty exists independent of the contract; (2) the
nature of the injury, the manner of the injury and the resulting harm; and (3)
whether the contract provided for services with a significant impact on the public
interest. See id. at 1180-81. With respect to the first of these, the court stated that
no extra-contractual fiduciary or professional duty existed. See id. at 1180 (stating
that duty not to commit fraud is not relevant to negligence claim). With respect to
the second, the court expressed the view that "economic loss is not recoverable
under a theory of negligence." Id. at 1181. The claim was typical of contract
claims. See id. There was no cataclysm that might otherwise support a tort claim.
See id. Finally, with respect to the third guidepost, the court believed that there was
a public interest in protecting pension funds, but that the public interest was ade-
quately protected by contract law. See id. (stating that if plaintiffs prevail on breach
of contract claim, pension funds will be restored). The court stated: "[P]ublic
interest alone is insufficient grounds upon which to base a tort claim, in light of
the absence of the requisite allegations of personal injury or property damages."
Id. The court applied a similar analysis to dispose of the plaintiffs' fraud claims,
demonstrating that they, like the negligence claims, were merely allegations of fail-
ure to perform contractual duties. See id. at 1183 (noting that fraud claims were
not independent of breach of contract claim).
The New York court was helpful in its approach. Not only did it indepen-
dently assess whether the parties stood in a fiduciary relationship vis-it-vis one an-
other, but it also went on to give an analytical framework for sorting out the
propriety of contract and tort and their respective public policy concerns. While
the use of the term "extracontractual fiduciary duty" remains confusing, at least
the court attempted to resolve the issue in a policy framework that might help
subsequent litigants and courts. It is only such an analysis that can yield stable and
satisfactory results.
244. 736 F. Supp. 587 (D.NJ. 1990).
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loan.245 The court found that the only obligation undertaken by
the defendant was one of good faith consideration of the loan.246
Because the defendant acted in such a manner, it owed no other
contractual obligation to the plaintiff.2 47
The court then went on to consider whether the defendant
owed any tort or fiduciary duties to the plaintiff:
It has long been the law that remedies in tort relating
to a breach of contract may not be maintained in addition
to those established under the contract itself in the ab-
sence of any independent duty owed by the breaching
party .... Where a party does not owe another a duty of
care absent the existence of a contract, a separate duty of
care cannot arise simply by virtue of the existence of the
contract. Indeed, it is fundamental that a party's liability
for breach should be governed strictly by the application
of foreseeable damages stemming from the establishment
of the contractual relationship. To hold otherwise would
chill business relations through the application of unfore-
seen damages upon one who may elect to effectively
breach an agreement. It has, thus, consistently been held
that an independent tort action is not cognizable where
there is no duty owed to the plaintiff other than the duty
arising out of the contract itself.248
In light of the court's finding that there had been no breach of
contract and the plaintiff's failure to allege any other indepen-
dently tortious behavior or fiduciary relationship, the court's deci-
sion can be simply stated as the plaintiff's failure to adequately
allege factual support for any cause of action, tort or otherwise. 249
245. Id. at 589. The complaint asserted breach of contract, fraud and misrep-
resentation, malicious and negligent breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty
and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory and equitable estoppel
and other claims based on state law. See id. The defendant moved for summary
judgment on all counts. See id.
246. See id. at 595 (holding that terms of agreement required that defendant
bargain in good faith over possibility of granting loan).
247. See id. (stating that as long as defendant made its decision in reasonable
manner, no liability can attach to defendant's decision not to fund).
248. Id. at 597. With respect to the fraud and equitable estoppel claims, the
court found them wholly unsupported by the facts. See id. at 598, 600 (stating that
reliance by plaintiff was not reasonable under circumstances and that absence of
factual support for misrepresentation claim precludes equitable estoppel claim).
With respect to the claims for outrageous and wanton conduct, the court likewise
found no support for the claims. See id. at 600.
249. See id. at 601. This analysis applied likewise to the breach of fiduciary
duty claim. See id. at 597 (noting absence of independent fiduciary duty owed by
[Vol. 42: p. 789
50
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss3/2
THE ELR AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DuTy
IV. DOCTRINAL WEAKNESSES OF THE ELR IN THE FIDUCIARY
CONTEXT
These cases illustrate the breakdown of the ELR as it is applied
in a fiduciary context. The fiduciary context is different from the
products liability context of the ELR's origin in many significant
respects. 250 The law of products liability is principally concerned
with the redress of personal injury and property damage. 25' A re-
lated concern is the deterrence of unsafe design and manufactur-
ing processes.25 2 The law of fiduciary duty, however, has other
concerns. It seeks to redress and deter breaches of trust that gener-
ally result in economic loss, not personal injury or property
damage. 253
Moreover, products liability actions may easily be between
strangers-an injured customer sues a faceless manufacturer far
away in the distribution chain.2 54 Breach of fiduciary duty actions,
however, are generally between people who have some knowledge
of each other, at least to the extent that the fiduciary has accepted
the trust and responsibility reposed in him by the other party.2 55
Despite these considerable differences between the products
liability and the fiduciary contexts, some courts have held that the
ELR bars fiduciary duty claims, while others have confused the issue
lender to borrower). The language about "an independent tort action" is, how-
ever, confusing with respect to the fiduciary duty claim. It does not consider that
privity and a fiduciary relationship might arise simultaneously. It again does not
explain what effect, if any, the contract has on the claim for breach of fiduciary
duty. Such loose analysis opens the door to the difficulties encountered by Florida
and Illinois.
250. For a further discussion of the difference between the products liability
context and the fiduciary context, see infra notes 250-55 and accompanying text.
251. See JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE & SCHwARrz's CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 694 (9th ed. 1994) (defining products liability as liability of
manufacturer, seller or other supplier of chattels, to one with whom there is no
privity of contract, who suffers physical harm caused by chattel).
252. See id. at 694 (stating one position that strict liability acts as policing
mechanism on product safety).
253. See, e.g., Metcalf v. Leedy, Wheeler & Co., 191 So. 690, 691-92 (Fla. 1939)
(holding that same remedy exists on behalf of injured party in fiduciary relation-
ship as exists against trustee on behalf of cestui que trust); Pickering v. El Jay
Equip. Co., Inc., 700 P.2d 134, 139 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (holding that measure of
damages in action for breach of fiduciary duty is same as measure of damages in
action for breach of trust).
254. See WADE ET AL., supra note 251, at 694 (stating that definition of prod-
ucts liability applies to two parties not in privity of contract with one another).
255. See Metcalf, 191 So. at 691 (stating that fiduciary relation exists when con-
fidence is reposed on one side and superiority and influence on other).
19971
51
Esquibel: The Economic Loss Rule and Fiduciary Duty Claims: Nothing Stricte
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
beyond predictability.2 5 6 Both scenarios are undesirable. Gener-
ally, the reason for this confusion has been the courts' improper
focus on the common existence of privity between the parties and
the characterization of a victim's loss as only economic.
The use of the ELR to bar claims of fiduciary duty relegates an
aggrieved party to his or her contractual remedy.257 This remedy is
not as likely to make the aggrieved party "whole" as would a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty. Furthermore, a contract remedy does
not have the same deterrent effect as a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty because punitive damages are generally not available even for
intentional breaches of contract. 25 8
Generally, therefore, a plaintiff litigant may prefer, all things
being equal, to state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty
over a contract claim. Not only does it increase the expected value
of the litigation to plaintiff, but it also increases the defendant's risk
of continuing in a lawsuit. 259 The defendant, of course, prefers the
opposite, and would generally prefer to face only contract claims.
256. Compare Interstate Sec. Corp. v. Hayes Corp., 920 F.2d 769, 777 (lth Cir.
1991) (holding that, if ELR bars fraud claim under Florida law, breach of fiduciary
duty claim must likewise be prohibited), and Benedict Feeding Co. v. Priest, No.
96-1836-CIV-T-17, 1997 WL 75605, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 1997) (barring breach
of fiduciary duty claim and foreclosing plaintiff's recovery of damages), with St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Great Lakes Turnings, Ltd., 774 F. Supp. 485, 490
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding ELR did not apply to breach of fiduciary claim), and
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Miller, 781 F. Supp. 1271, 1277 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (find-
ing ELR inapplicable as bar to breach of fiduciary duty claim when such duty was
beyond contractual obligations).
257. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REv. 1, 6 (1990) (arguing that share-
holders may opt out of liability rules as long as securities markets sufficiently disci-
pline contractual choices); Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the
Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1703, 1704 (1989) (noting that, under
Delaware law, corporations may "opt out" of otherwise applicable judge-made rules
of fiduciary duty). But see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1597 (1989) (arguing that opting out of fiduciary
duties through charter amendment should be disallowed).
258. For a general discussion of punitive damages in contract cases, see RoB-
ERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THE-
ORY, DOCTRINE AND PRAcTICE 265-66 (2d ed. 1992).
259. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An
Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 110 (1983) (arguing for an economic
analysis of accidents). For example, assume the likelihood of a $1,000,000 punitive
damage award may be only one percent. This makes the expected value (over
compensatory damages) of the litigation to the plaintiff $10,000. The marginal
cost of allegations to support a punitive damage claim is low so the plaintiff will
more than likely make them. From the defendant's perspective, there is a chance
(however small) that he will owe plaintiff $1,000,000. Because most individuals are
risk averse, they will choose paying the $10,000 to remove the risk of owing
$1,000,000.
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But the pertinent question is what, from a public policy perspective,
should society prefer.
Application of the ELR to bar breach of fiduciary duty claims
erodes the higher standard of loyalty and care that one traditionally
associates with a fiduciary relationship. Barring claims for breach
of fiduciary duty does not encourage the utmost fairness by a fiduci-
ary, nor does it discourage overreaching by a fiduciary. A fiduciary
relationship is, by definition, an unequal one in that the fiduciary
is, in some sense, the superior of his charge.2 60 In this light, rele-
gating a victim of a breach of fiduciary duty to an "arm's length,"
"bargained for" remedy infers that a fiduciary relationship has no
special meaning to society.
It is also useful to contrast the above outcome with the case of
someone who has a fiduciary relationship, but is not in privity of
contract with the fiduciary. To date, there has been no decision
applying the ELR to bar this type of claim. 261 To do so would defy
logic, eviscerate the law of fiduciary duty and threaten all tort
claims designed to redress principally economic loss.
Putting this speculation aside, the victim in this situation would
not be limited to contract damages in the event of a breach of fidu-
ciary duty claim. Instead, he or she could pursue recovery of dam-
ages proximately caused by the breach of duty, as well as punitive
damages. The beneficiary who has a contract, and therefore, no
viable breach of fiduciary duty claim brings to mind the old adage
that "no good deed goes unpunished."2 62
It does not seem that one should, by operation of the ELR, be
made worse off by the mere existence of privity and the consequent
allocation of some risks. The ELR closes the tort escape for some-
one who makes bad bargains or reasonably fails to protect himself
or herself. Hence, in economic terms, the ELR encourages invest-
ment in contracting because parties expect that the bargain will be
upheld, not circumvented. To bar breach of fiduciary duty claims
just because the parties are in privity would probably also spur inef-
ficient, excessive efforts at covering all contingencies among parties
260. See Metcalf, 191 So. at 691 (stating that fiduciary relation exists when con-
fidence is reposed on one side and there is resulting superiority and influence on
other side).
261. But see Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons,
Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Fla. 1993) (holding that economic loss doctrine ap-
plies to homeowners and purchase of house).
262. Lamberti v. United States, No. CV-95-3414, 1995 WL 591305, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1995); Miller v. Harmon, No. CIV.A.89-2735, 1989 WL 150919,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 1989).
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in a contract. Limited time, resources and rationality suggest the
lunacy of encouraging such efforts.2 63 Moreover, tort law has tradi-
tionally performed a gap-filling function with respect to contractual
relationships. 264 More specifically, fiduciary duties have tradition-
ally stepped in to compensate individuals, even when the relation-
ship was otherwise governed by a contract. 265
Before the ELR, parties were fairly confident that at least in the
fiduciary context, other law would fill in.266 In other words, a court
263. See, e.g., Heidi A. Irvin & Mark S. Carlson, Comment, Recovery of Pure
Economic Loss in Product Liability Actions: An Economic Comparison of Three Legal Rules,
11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 283, 285 (1988) ("[I]n the allocation of pure eco-
nomic loss caused by product failure, the negligence rule is generally more effi-
cient than a strict liability rule and that a contract rule is almost always more
efficient than a negligence rule."). These commentators also stated:
The tort system can be explained in terms of two economic roles it
plays in our society. One role is deterrence .... A second role tort law
plays is to allow victims, who are otherwise eligible, to recover damages
that adequately reflect their losses .... Consequently, the adequacy of a
tort rule in dealing with an injury should be determined by comparing it
to the hypothetical rule to which the parties would have agreed if they
could have bargained. In contract law, damage measures may act as a
substitute for complete contingent contracts. In theory, parties to a con-
tract could bargain for every possible contingency. Damage measures are
needed, however, because the cost of bargaining over every contingency
is too high and because the occurrence of some contingencies may be
difficult or impossible to verify .... Commentators are not in complete
agreement that the Hadley rule is better than other rules, but they do
agree that the foreseeability requirement is more efficient than a rule
allowing unforeseen damages.
Id. at 285-87 (footnotes omitted); see alsoJeffrey M. Perloff, Breach of Contract and the
Foreseeability Doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale, 10J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 40 (1981) ("[A]
breach of contract occurs because the parties involved did not write a full contin-
gent contract that accounted for the special events that led to the breach. The
absence of a contingent contract could be due to the parties' lack of foresight...
asymmetric information ... , or high costs of contracting.").
264. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 127 (1989) (discussing how effi-
ciency-minded courts should fill gaps in contracts); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and
Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 320 (1985) (examining process in
which contracting parties combine express and implied terms in formulating
agreement). For a discussion of gap filling in the close corporation context, see
generally Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A
Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 216 (1992).
265. See Murphy v. Seabarge, Ltd., 868 S.W.2d 929, 936 (Tex. App. 1994)
(holding that breach of partnership agreement also constituted breach of fiduciary
duty). A classic example is partnership agreements. It would be folly to bar
breach of fiduciary duty claims in such an instance. The legal disruption would be
enormous, as traditional expectations of the relationship would be turned on their
heads.
266. See generally Lawrence Kalevitch, Gaps in Contracts: A Critique of Consent
Theory, 54 MONT. L. REV. 169, 176-82 (1993) (discussing role of, need for and the-
ory behind gapfillers).
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would read a contract in the context of the parties' relationship.
Some of the decisions discussed above, however, suggest that what
the parties previously assumed was incorporated by operation of law
in their contracts, namely fiduciary obligations, may no longer be
incorporated. 267
The irony of applying the ELR beyond the products liability
arena in the fiduciary context is that, in the name of preserving the
distinction between contract and tort, the traditional policies un-
derlying each may be thwarted. 268 Deference to and support of
freedom of contract is critical to the success of commercial law and
the market system it serves. 269 When a party disappoints expectancy
interests in a contract, the law must provide a reliable remedy.270
But freedom of contract is, of course, not the only method of
allocating risk and resources.271 Tort liability is another classic
267. SeeJoe E. Manuel & Gregory B. Richards, Economic Loss in Strict Liability -
Beyond the Realm of 402A, 16 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REv. 315, 316 (1986) (examining
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A in light of denying recovery of purely eco-
nomic loss in strict tort); James E. Moore, Agristor Leasing v. Spindler: Economic
Loss, Strict Liability and the UC.C.-What a Mess, 34 S.D. L. REv. 101, 104 (1989)
(discussing courts' failure to regard policies connecting strict liability and eco-
nomic loss).
268. Cf Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expec-
tancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 61, 62 (1982) (pro-
posing "unlawful means" test to restrict tort liability to cases where defendant's act
is independently wrongful). This author stated:
The tort of interference with contract or prospective relationships is
applied in widely divergent settings, yet courts disagree on important fun-
damentals of the tort and its proper application.... Where the defend-
ant's act of interference is independently unlawful, tort objectives
predominate; where the defendant's behavior is lawful except for the re-
sulting interference, tort theory should reflect and remain consistent with
contract policies.
Id. at 128.
269. See SUMMER & HILLMAN, supra note 258, at 52-53 (discussing private au-
tonomy as substantive basis of contract liability).
270. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. b (1981) (discuss-
ing expectation interests and appropriate remedies).
271. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of
Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1985) (analyzing direct cost of harm and cost of
precaution against harm). Cooter states that:
Tort, contract, and property law all allocate the cost of harm ....
The crucial difference between contracts and torts can be summarized in
three sentences: If damages are stipulated in advance, then the victim
has efficient incentives to reduce the extent of injury, much as if there
were no compensation. By contrast, the victim's incentive to reduce the
probability of injury is reduced in part by payment of damages, and is
thus lower than if there were no compensation. Precaution against tor-
tious accidents can reduce both their probability and gravity, whereas re-
duction of reliance on a contract can affect the extent of harm caused by
breach, but not the probability of breach.
Id. at 27, 30 (footnote omitted).
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method. 272 When society has determined that tort liability should
exist, it has decided that such liability would enhance the conse-
quent allocation of such risk and the distribution of resources in
accordance with this view.273
Additionally, society authorizes the recovery of compensatory
and punitive damages in tort cases when it wishes to actively pro-
mote a system of private enforcement and deterrence of wrongful
conduct.274 The assumption is that injured individuals will have the
most incentive to sue in an attempt to redress a harm. In the pro-
cess of doing so, this individual may perform a welfare enhancing
function by reducing the likelihood that others will commit the
same acts or increasing the likelihood that individuals will take pre-
ventive measures. In a sense, both contract and tort, albeit by dif-
ferent means, attempt a rational allocation of risks and
resources.
2 75
It is the purported social need to preserve the boundaries be-
tween contract and tort that has led to the development of the
ELR.27 6 The ELR is not, however, an analytically sound way of
maintaining the tort/contract boundary in all contexts. Nor should
272. See Winterstein v. Wilcom, 293 A.2d 821, 824 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972)
(holding that exculpatory agreements allocating risk to one party are valid if not
void against public policy). While harsh, it is necessary to understand that a society
might permit victims among its citizenry to bear the risk, and consequent harm, of
others' wrongful deeds, refusing them a compensatory mechanism.
273. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-305 to 2-311 (1994) (listing provisions supplying
terms to sales contracts). This is the same thing, although on a lesser scale, that a
court does when it supplies reasonable terms of a contract; it is allocating the risk.
It is doing so on the basis of policies, however, that should be evident at the time of
the decision.
274. See WADE ET AL., supra note 251, at 530-31 (discussing functions of puni-
tive damages). The commonly cited tort objective of providing deterrence exists
when compensation is provided but not to the same degree as when punitive dam-
ages are awarded. See id. at 531 (stating punitive damages have been defended as
discouragement of evil motives). Just as importantly, the compensatory mecha-
nism in contract actions provides the same deterrent effect with respect to
breaches of contract. In the latter instance, however, punitive damages are not
available to further deter the conduct.
275. For a further discussion about tort and contract risk allocations, see
supra notes 263-74 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH Or CONTRACT 1 (1974) ("We are
told that Contract, like God, is dead."); Christopher Scott D'Angelo, The Economic
Loss Doctrine: Saving Contract Warranty Law from Drowning in a Sea of Torts, 26 U.
TOL. L. REv. 591, 591 (1995) (supporting inclusion of economic loss doctrine in
proposed Restatement of Torts); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN.
L. REv. 791, 794 (1966) (discussing traditional distinctions between contract and
tort and their erosion); William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liabil-
ity to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099 (1960) (inquiring into cases in which
seller of chattels defends against person not in privity with seller).
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courts preserve that boundary at all costs. A court must step back to
figure out what social purpose the boundary was designed to serve.
The ELR is a mere factual description of a considerable
number of scenarios in which policy reasons support a bar of recov-
ery for economic damages, mainly products liability claims involv-
ing no personal injury or property damages. 277 Because it is only a
factual description, however, the ELR does not stand up well when
courts and litigants apply it in other contexts. It ignores the fact
that the law specifically sanctions claims for breach of fiduciary duty
and other torts designed to redress economic loss. 278 It also ig-
nores the fact that contractual relationships often accompany fidu-
ciary ones. Additionally, it ignores the reality of a beneficiary's
bargaining position vis-I-vis his fiduciary. 279 Perhaps, most signifi-
cantly, the ELR forces the policy of deterring bad conduct by a fidu-
ciary to the wayside.
Contract seems an inferior method to tort for dealing with
these difficulties. This is consistent with the view that a breach of
fiduciary duty is a constructive fraud perpetrated on the benefici-
ary.280 Courts have found tort claims superior to contract claims in
dealing with matters of fraud, especially fraud in the induce-
ment.28 1 As the ELR should not logically bar fraud in the induce-
ment claims, neither should it bar claims of constructive fraud
because the beneficiary, like someone fraudulently induced, cannot
adequately protect himself through bargaining. The very nature of
a fiduciary or fraudulently induced relationship often forbids this
type of bargaining.
277. See, e.g., Redman v. John D. Brush & Co., 111 F.3d 1174, 1182 (4th Cir.
1997) (recognizing that precluding recovery of economic losses in tort action pre-
serves balance of rights and remedies in warranty law).
278. See WADE ET AL., supra note 251, at 1 (stating that one purpose of tort law
is to restore injured parties to their original condition through compensation).
279. See, e.g., Metcalf v. Leedy, Wheeler & Co., 191 So. 690, 691 (Fla. 1939)
(stating that fiduciary relation exists when confidence is reposed on one side and
there is resulting superiority and influence on other side).
280. See, e.g., Salahutdin v. Valley of Cal., Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 463, 467 (Ct.
App. 1994) (recognizing that breach of fiduciary duty usually constitutes construc-
tive fraud); Rogers v. Mitzi, 584 So. 2d 1092, 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (hold-
ing that partners sufficiently pled constructive fraud against defendant partner by
alleging breach of fiduciary duty); In re Estate of Snyder, 880 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1994) (stating that breach of fiduciary duty is constructive fraud); Wolf v.
Walt, 530 N.W.2d 890, 898 (Neb. 1995) (stating that constructive fraud involves
breach of fiduciary duty).
281. See, e.g., HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239
(Fla. 1996) (recognizing that one who has been fraudulently induced into contract
may elect to stand by that contract and sue for damages for fraud).
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In fact, contrary to some of the cases previously described, the
ELR as applied in negligence cases often contains an exception for
"special relationships." 282 This relationship has been satisfied by a
variety of fiduciary and professional relationships. If the court per-
mitted, for policy reasons, an exception to the bar of negligence
claims based on these types of relationships, then the ELR should
not bar a fortiori a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.283
Finally, the defendant at the motion to dismiss stage often
raises the ELR.284 This is not surprising because the defendant
would like, at the earliest juncture, relief of the threat of tort dam-
ages. The mechanical application of the ELR in the fiduciary con-
text, however, has the unfortunate effect of forcing a plaintiff into
an involuntary and premature election of remedies because the
existence of a contract claim might eliminate a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty.2 85
282. See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp.,
725 F. Supp. 656, 667 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (indicating that plaintiff argued that special
relationship of trust and confidence with defendant gave rise to independent tort
duty to act with care in negligence action).
283. See David B. Gaebler, Negligence, Economic Loss, and the U.C.C., 61 IND. L.J.
593, 599 (1986) (advocating narrow exception to economic loss rule to prevent
action for negligent performance of services in complex engineering situations).
Gaebler stated that:
Even where the plaintiff suffers exclusively economic loss, courts permit
recovery in negligence where there is some special relationship between
the parties. A sufficient relationship is found most easily where the de-
fendant stands in a fiduciary or professional relationship to the plaintiff.
Thus a trustee may be liable if in fulfilling his trust he negligently injures
the economic interests of a beneficiary. Similarly an accountant, attor-
ney, architect, engineer or other professional may be liable to his client
for malpractice even though the damages are purely economic. More-
over, liability for economic loss caused by negligent performance of serv-
ices is not limited to professional malpractice actions but rather may
extend to other service transactions as well.
Id. at 603-05 (footnotes omitted); see also Hnatt, supra note 18, at 1196 ("Courts
have developed a second group of exceptions in the context of a 'special relation-
ship.' These cases have involved a special relationship between the negligent
tortfeasor and the foreseeable plaintiffs.").
284. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holland & Knight, 832 F. Supp. 1528,
1530 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (indicating defendant sought to dismiss breach of fiduciary
claim based on ELR); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 725 F. Supp. at 657, 659 (indi-
cating that defendant moved for dismissal because complaint failed to allege exist-
ence of tort duty independent of contractual obligations).
285. See Benedict Feeding Co., Inc. v. Priest, No. 96-1836-CIV-T-17, 1997 WL
75605, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 1997) (barring breach of fiduciary duty claim and
foreclosing opportunity for plaintiff to recover damages); City of Miami Firefight-
ers' & Police Officers' Retirement Trust v. Invesco Mgmt., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 392,
394-95 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (dismissing breach of fiduciary duty claim and limiting
potential recovery to breach of contract claims).
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. In this sense, the ELR impinges not only on the policies under-
lying the substantive claim of breach of fiduciary duty, but also on
the policies underlying pleading rules. 28 6 A principal policy under-
lying liberal pleading is to prevent the foreclosure of claims based
on technicalities without providing the opportunity for parties to
develop supporting proof.28 7 Applying the ELR, especially early in
the case, deprives a plaintiff of an opportunity to demonstrate what
may be egregious conduct on the part of a fiduciary who deserves
punishment. Moreover, this is a highly fact-sensitive determination
that the courts should not undertake without the benefit of
discovery.
V. SUBSTITUTE ANALYSIS
The starting point in evaluating the propriety of an action to
recover economic loss for breach of fiduciary duty is not the ELR.
This doctrine should have no role in assessing the viability of claims
for breach of fiduciary duty. Neither should the allegation of or
existence of other claims for tort or contract.
Instead, the court should examine the plaintiffs allegations
and proof of a breach of a fiduciary duty in a relational sense. What
is relevant is whether the allegations or proof show the essential
elements of a traditional breach of fiduciary duty: whether the
plaintiff reposed trust and confidence in the fiduciary to act in the
best interest of the plaintiff; whether the alleged fiduciary accepted
the confidence reposed in him or her, or accepted responsibility in
some sense for the affairs of the plaintiff; whether the alleged fidu-
ciary exerted domination, influence, superiority or control over the
plaintiff; and whether the alleged fiduciary abused the plaintiffs
trust and confidence resulting in economic loss to the plaintiff.288
If the court believes that the plaintiff has adequately alleged or has
proof of these things, it should let the claim for breach of fiduciary
duty stand.
Moreover, this should be true even if the plaintiff alleges that
the breach of fiduciary duty was an act of negligence by the fiduci-
ary, provided that negligence is the applicable standard of care that
286. For a further discussion of this area, see supra notes 96-111 and accompa-
nying text.
287. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) ("The Federal Rules [of
Civil Procedure] reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that
the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.").
288. For a further discussion of the nature of fiduciary relationships, see supra
notes 3, 253-55 and accompanying text.
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the fiduciary must use. Once again, the touchstone for the court
should be the existence of a fiduciary relationship. On the one
hand, if there is no such relationship, it may be appropriate to ap-
ply the ELR to bar the claim as nothing more than a tort action for
pure economic loss between those with no special relationship. 289
On the other hand, if a fiduciary relationship does exist, the court
should not discard a claim for breach of fiduciary duty merely be-
cause the plaintiff alleges that the fiduciary acted negligently.2 90
Acts of negligence can be breaches of fiduciary duty, but only in the
context of such a relationship. Furthermore, the policies in sup-
port of actions for breach of fiduciary duty apply to a negligent fi-
duciary, as well as a fiduciary perpetrating a fraud, although the acts
of the former may not support a claim for punitive damages.
In this regard, courts have uniformly held that in order to re-
ceive an award of punitive damages, a plaintiff must establish that
the defendant acted willfully, maliciously, wantonly or with reckless
indifference to the rights of the plaintiff.29 1 In light of this, preser-
vation of victims' rights to sue for breaches of fiduciary duty based
upon merely negligent conduct will generally not result in exposing
defendants to punitive damages awards. 292 Therefore, defendants
will be liable only to the extent necessary to make the plaintiff
whole. A fiduciary that acts willfully, maliciously, wantonly or reck-
lessly, however, will potentially face punitive damages.293
289. See Interstate Sec. Corp. v. Hayes Corp., 920 F.2d 769, 770 (11th Cir.
1991) (commenting on contractual relations between Hayes and Interstate).
290. See City of Miami Firefighters', 789 F. Supp. at 394 (mentioning negligence
concepts in contract).
291. See, e.g., Markey v. Santangelo, 485 A.2d 1305, 1307 (Conn. 1985) (stat-
ing that punitive damages are recoverable upon showing of wanton or willful mali-
cious misconduct); Goo v. Continental Cas. Co., 473 P.2d 563, 566 (Haw. 1970)
(recognizing that punitive damages are recoverable for willful, malicious, wanton
or aggravated wrongs when defendant has acted with reckless indifference to rights
of another); Boling v. A-i Detective & Patrol Serv., Inc., 659 So. 2d 586, 588 (Miss.
1995) (noting that plaintiff seeking punitive damages must demonstrate willful or
malicious wrong, or gross, reckless disregard for rights of others); Honeywell v.
Sterling Furniture Co., 797 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Or. 1990) (stating that punitive dam-
ages are allowed to punish willful, wanton or malicious wrongdoer and to deter
that wrongdoer and others from like conduct in future).
292. See SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 258, at 256-66 (discussing generally
when punitive damages available in breach of contract actions); see also Chutorian,
supra note 15, at 378-91 (discussing how some courts, dissatisfied with traditional
contract remedies, have applied tort principles, including punitive damages, to
various areas of contract law).
293. See, e.g., Wagman v. Lee, 457 A.2d 401, 404 (D.C. 1983) (noting punitive
damages are reasonable if there exists independent fiduciary relationship); Capital
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hohman, 682 P.2d 1309, 1310 (Kan. 1984) (awarding
mortgagers punitive damages for breach of fiduciary duty by bank); Manges v.
Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. 1984) (awarding recovery of actual and exem-
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This approach also rationally eliminates the procedural
problems. If the procedural posture of a case is a motion to dismiss
and the plaintiff's allegations are adequate, the court should permit
the claim to stand until a subsequent motion for summary judg-
ment.294 Upon a summary judgment motion, the court can reassess
the claim and determine whether there is proof of a fiduciary rela-
tionship. If, at this point, the court believes that the plaintiff has
failed to establish a "genuine issue as to any material fact," then it
may grant summary judgment on the fiduciary duty claim and leave
the plaintiff with whatever remedies remain. 295
Accordingly, courts would grant motions to dismiss on breach
of fiduciary duty claims only when the relationship of the parties, as
alleged in the four corners of the complaint, was not, as a matter of
law, a fiduciary one.29 6 Otherwise, the court should give the plain-
tiff an opportunity to develop its case through the discovery pro-
cess. In essence, this substitute analysis restores the traditional
understanding of alternative pleading and proof of fiduciary duty
claims.2 97 As a practical matter, if a court permits a breach of fidu-
ciary duty claim to stand, a defendant faces the possibility of having
to pay greater compensatory and punitive damages than he or she
plary damages against breaching fiduciary); Mulder v. Mittelstadt, 352 N.W.2d 223,
229 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (awarding shareholders punitive damages for directors'
breach of fiduciary duty).
294. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The text states in relevant part:
If on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity
to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Id.
295. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
296. See, e.g., Benedict Feeding Co., Inc. v. Priest, No. 96-1836-CIV-T-17, 1997
WL 75605, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 1997) (barring breach of fiduciary duty claim
and foreclosing opportunity for plaintiff to recover damages); Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Holland & Knight, 832 F. Supp. 1528, 1530 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (indicating
defendant sought to dismiss breach of fiduciary claim based on ELR); City of
Miami Firefighters' & Police Officers' Retirement Trust v. Invesco Mgmt., Inc., 789
F. Supp. 392, 394-95 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (dismissing breach of fiduciary duty claim
and limiting potential recovery to breach of contract claims); Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp. v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 725 F. Supp. 656, 657-59 (N.D.N.Y.
1989) (indicating that defendant moved for dismissal because complaint failed to
allege existence of tort duty independent of contractual obligations).
297. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a), (e) (1987) (authorizing pleading in alternative
without regard to sufficiency or consistency of other claims); Holland & Knight,
832 F. Supp. at 1531-32 (applying Rule 8(e) (2) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to plaintiffs complaint); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 108, at 532-33 (abrogating
"theory of pleadings" doctrine that required plaintiff to seek, and be awarded, re-
covery on only one theory).
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might for a breach of contract claim. This is appropriate. Courts
should not unfairly shield fiduciaries from the harm they cause
their beneficiaries by the existence of a contract.298 Furthermore,
this analysis recognizes that in a society that promotes complex
commercial transactions, there will be transactions that may impli-
cate contractual, tort and fiduciary duties. In light of this, it is im-
practical, if not unrealistic, to apply the ELR so as to promote
artificial, and often times meaningless, distinctions between con-
tract and tort claims and economic and noneconomic loss.
The basis for this substitute analysis is public policy, the rela-
tionship of the parties and the resulting societal expectations. 2 99 It
speaks to the heightened responsibility of a fiduciary with respect to
his or her duties, however they may arise and however they may be
labeled. This approach also recognizes that where a fiduciary rela-
tionship exists, the "bargaining process" may not be at "arm's
length," and hence, one of the parties deserves additional protec-
tion by the law.30 0 In other words, the likelihood is high that the
contract resulting from the "bargaining" of a fiduciary and his or
her beneficiary is going to be, from a public policy perspective, in-
adequate to protect the beneficiary. This scenario is different than
a plaintiff outside of the fiduciary context, who simply claims inade-
quate bargaining power, resources or foresight to prevent an argua-
bly unfair ex post outcome. 30 1 The two situations must be carefully
distinguished.
In the latter case, the plaintiff and defendant had the opportu-
nity to bargain and to protect themselves accordingly. If they failed
298. See Lamberti v. United States, No. CV-95-3414, 1995 WL 591305, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1995); Miller v. Harmon, No. CIV.A.89-2735, 1989 WL 150919,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 1989).
299. See East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S.
858, 876 (1986) (stating that tort actions served different purpose, namely, to pro-
tect and redress the individuals in society who were injured by manufacturer's
carelessness); Bond, supra note 18, at 231-34 (noting that public policy supports
ELR); House & Bell, supra note 18, at 29-30 (supporting policy concerns behind
application of ELR).
300. For a general discussion of the relationship between the parties in a fidu-
ciary relationship, see supra notes 3 & 253-55 and accompanying text.
301. See Bachi & Rockenbach, supra note 150, at 92 ("In cases involving serv-
ices, professional or otherwise, the independent tort doctrine remains a viable
boundary between contract and tort law."); Buesing &Johnson, supra note 150, at
38 ("Lawsuits have sometimes been fueled by a party who, unhappy in hindsight
with the negotiated contract, attempts to insert new terms into the agreement by
seeking tort remedies when the contractual remedies are unfavorable."); Wagner
& Solomon, supra note 46, at 48 (stating that contract law is designed to protect
private parties, while tort law is designed to protect society as whole from physical
harm).
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to do so when they "should" have, courts should not permit tort
actions to rescue the plaintiff. This clearly preserves the ex ante
incentives to contract. While overexpansion of the ELR is detri-
mental, the law should also not enter the fray of determining ex
post the fairness of arm's length transactions. That is, and should
be, largely a market function.
Nothing in this approach, therefore, should be read to permit
a plaintiff to circumvent his or her bargain by merely invoking the
magical words "breach of fiduciary duty." The differences between
contract and tort still have relevance and will as long as private or-
dering is a prominent feature of the law. 30 2 Generally, courts
should hold parties to the bargain they have made so as to not dis-
rupt the loss allocation scheme made by the parties. To do other-
wise would introduce strategic incentives that undermine the
reliability of the law.
Additionally, it may be that even in the context of a fiduciary
relationship, a contract between the parties may be relevant to de-
termining the existence of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
This will only be the case when the parties have somehow defined,
within the bounds of the law, the fiduciary duties owed or the appli-
cable standards of loyalty or care. Importantly, for our purposes,
this determination is, and should be, an exercise in contractual in-
terpretation analytically distinct from the application of the ELR.
This approach, therefore, does not relieve courts of the burden of
distinguishing contract claims from breach of fiduciary duty claims.
In fact, this approach relies heavily, in the common law tradition,
on courts' ability to make reasoned, not mechanical, distinctions in
this regard. 0 3
302. See Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1185, 1186 (Ill. 1992) (explicating dif-
ference between contract and tort claims). The court stated:
Contract law applies to voluntary obligations freely entered into between
parties. Damages recoverable under a breach of contract theory are
based upon the mutual expectation of the parties. The basic principle
for the measurement of contract damages is that the injured party is enti-
fled to recover an amount that will put him in as good a position as he
would have been had the contract been performed as agreed. Tort law,
on the other hand, applies in situations where society recognizes a duty to
exist wholly apart from any contractual undertaking. Tort obligations are
general obligations that impose liability when a person negligently, care-
lessly, or purposely causes injury to others.
Id.
303. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294, 1300 (5th Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing that sophisticated limited partners who contractually agreed that they were not
entitled to certain information could not circumvent agreement by alleging
breaches of fiduciary duty by general partner when general partner bought out
their interests without disclosing said information).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The ELR is a useful device in the products liability context to
limit a multiplicity of actions and a defendant's overexposure to
liability.30 4 In that context, economic loss without accompanying
personal injury or property damage is sensibly borne by the "failing
to contract plaintiff" who knew his or her purposes and could have
protected himself or herself in warranty against disappointed ex-
pectations. Despite this, experience cautions against mechanical
extensions of the ELR to the very different context involving fiduci-
ary relationships.
This Article has discussed cases in which courts applied the
ELR to bar claims for breach of fiduciary duty.30 5 The temptation
to do so arises because victims of breaches of fiduciary duty often
find themselves in privity with their fiduciary and suffering only
economic loss. Courts, however, must resist this temptation.
Shielding a wrongdoing fiduciary from fully restoring his or her vic-
tim and, perhaps, from paying punitive damages is against a long
history of public policy in favor of protecting a beneficiary of a fidu-
ciary relationship to the utmost and, correspondingly, deterring
bad conduct by fiduciaries. 30 6
304. See, e.g., Pollack v. Lytle, 175 Cal. Rptr. 81, 86 (Ct. App. 1981) (stating
fiduciary must place injured party in same position he would have enjoyed had
fiduciary faithfully performed his duties); Steelman v. Mallory, 716 P.2d 1282, 1286
(Idaho 1986) (ruling that measure of damages in breach of fiduciary duty claim by
corporate director is profit that director received); Henderson v. Hassur, 594 P.2d
650, 653 (Kan. 1979) (noting that disloyal agent required to account to his princi-
pal for secret profit and also had to forfeit compensation that he had received
from principal); Bessman v. Bessman, 520 P.2d 1210, 1211 (Kan. 1974) (requiring
faithless servant to forfeit compensation otherwise due for services rendered dur-
ing period of his faithfulness); Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990) (ruling that damages for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with
buyout of minority shareholder of closely held corporation was difference between
fair market value of minority shareholder's shares and amount he would have re-
ceived under buyout agreement); Line v. Rouse, 491 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Neb. 1992)
(measuring damages as monetary damage to estate caused by personal representa-
tive's breach of fiduciary duty); Stoeckel v. Block, 566 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (App. Div.
1991) (stating that former employees who breached fiduciary duty by soliciting
employer's customers are subject to damages in amount employer would have
made but for the employees' wrong, including lost opportunities for profits on
accounts diverted through employees' conduct).
305. For a discussion of the application of the ELR to fiduciary duty claims,
see supra notes 26-249 and accompanying text.
306. See generally Wagman v. Lee, 457 A.2d 401, 405 (D.C. 1983) (awarding
punitive damages as form of deterrent in breach of fiduciary duty claims); Atlantic
Nat'l Bank of Fla. v. Vest, 480 So. 2d 1328, 1332-33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(describing nature of, and duties within, fiduciary relationship); Mulder v. Mittel-
stadt, 352 N.W.2d 223, 230 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that record was sufficient
to warrant punitive damages to deter breach of fiduciary duty).
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Judge Cardozo spoke to this history and said:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday
world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to
those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to some-
thing stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sen-
sitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there
has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveter-
ate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of
undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of partic-
ular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for
fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden
by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any
judgment of this court.30 7
For this reason, the ELR should not operate to bar claims for
breach of fiduciary duty. Instead, where a plaintiff has alleged a
breach of fiduciary duty, the court should assess the relationship
between the parties. If the relationship is one that has the
hallmarks of fiduciary duty, including superiority, dominance, in-
fluence, trust and confidence, and the claim is otherwise consistent
with the social policies underlying claims of this nature, the court
should permit the claim for breach of fiduciary duty to stand pend-
ing an assessment of plaintiffs proof.
Emphasis on the relational aspects of the plaintiff's pleading
and proof of the breach of fiduciary duty should produce more ra-
tional results than the sometimes seemingly random ones produced
by application of the ELR. This approach will afford the traditional
protection to those harmed at the hands of their fiduciary but still
respect the important policy differences between contract and tort.
Hence, it will permit defendants to eliminate the risk of breach of
fiduciary duty claims when they owe merely contractual duties, but
it will also permit plaintiffs to pursue remedies for both breach of
contract and breach of fiduciary duty when appropriate.
307. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
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